ON REFORMING THE FEDERAL WRIT OF

HABEAS CORPUSt
Michael O'Neill, Esq. *
Over a quarter century ago, Judge Henry Friendly noted that
"[1] egal history has many instances where a remedy initially serving
a felt need has expanded bit by bit, without much thought being
given to any single step, until it has assumed an aspect so different
from its origin as to demand reappraisal-agonizing or not."' The
"remedy" Judge Friendly sought to reappraise was that of the writ
of habeas corpus. Over time, the venerated writ has been transformed from an important means of preventing illegal imprisonment to an all-encompassing remedy for whatever constitutional
ailment might befall a state criminal justice system.' The United
States Supreme Court has recast the writ from a check on executive
authority to a check on the authority of state courts to try criminal
cases. Unfortunately, or perhaps inevitably, the Court has waded
into this effort without appreciating the effects the creation of a
writ of general error would have on the criminal justice system, the
institutional integrity of state courts, or long-held principles of federalism and comity.
In the years since Judge Friendly penned his thoughtful observation on the writ's transformation, courts have undertaken considerable "reappraisal" of habeas corpus practice. In particular, the
Supreme Court has undertaken certain measures to cabin the
scope of federal habeas review in order to reduce its burgeoning
habeas caseload. Institutional barriers, however, prevent the Court
from doing little more than tinkering around the edges.' The burden of reform, to the extent reform is needed, falls squarely upon
Congress. Although numerous hearings have been held, and
t This article was delivered by the author as part of the Seton Hall Law Review's
Symposium on Capital Punishment, on November 2, 1995.
* Michael Edmund O'Neill received his BA. from Bringham Young University
and his J.D. from Yale Law School. Until recently Mr. O'Neill worked as Special
Counsel to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary.
1 HenryJ. Friendly, Is Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on CriminalJudgments,
38 U. CHi. L. REv. 142, 142 (1970).
2 For purposes of this article, I will be referring to the writ of habeas corpus ad
subjiciendum.
S Some commentators have suggested that the Supreme Court has done more to
muddy the habeas waters than to clear them.
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habeas has been the fodder of many a floor debate, Congress has
done little to revise federal habeas practice.
This is understandable, given the emotional arguments surrounding any attempt to reform habeas corpus. Few issues in federal criminal law are as misunderstood, or maligned, as the
doctrine surrounding the writ. Misunderstood, I believe, because
the writ has been loosed from its original legal moorings and transformed into a perceived cure-all for any defects (real and
imagined) occurring in the trial process. Maligned, because the
writ's critics increasingly believe that convicted criminals misuse
habeas corpus in an effort to delay the imposition ofjustly imposed
sentences.
Pointing to the United States Constitution for their support,
defenders of the status quo assert that the contemporary scope of
habeas corpus is necessary to prevent the innocent from suffering
unjust punishment. The hue and cry grows particularly loud when
capital cases are at issue. Proponents of the writ argue that the writ
stands as the sole protective device in shielding the innocent from
society's one irreversible penalty: unjust execution. According to
these reform critics, Congress cannot (or should not) restructure
the writ because to do so would trample constitutional values and
besmirch the writ's history.
On the other hand, lawmakers and scholars seeking to reform
habeas practice contend that it has been misused, that it serves to
prevent the imposition of just punishment, contributes to the mismanagement of judicial resources, and creates uncertainty within
the criminal justice system as it undermines principles of finality.
Reformers assert that a restructuring of procedures governing the
writ is necessary to bring it into conformity with accepted principles of judicial review. Invoking the mantra of comity, reformers
also argue that current habeas practices banish state tribunals to
second-class status.
The history of habeas practice informs much of the contemporary debate surrounding the writ. While the Constitution expressly
shields habeas corpus from suspension, one must understand the
nature of the remedy the Framers were seeking to protect. The
Delegates to the Philadelphia Convention would have understood
habeas corpus in the context of the times-the recent Revolution-and the writ's historical function in the colonies and in England. Accordingly, the first part of this Article will trace the writ's
history from its English common law origins through the early
American constitutional period.
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The second part of this Article will explore the transformation
that occurred as a result of the Civil War and the emancipation of
African-American slaves. This section will show that federal courts,
frustrated by their inability to provide relief to emancipated slaves
on direct review, and denied the authority to remove criminal
causes from state courts, invoked habeas corpus as a means of scrutinizing state criminal justice systems. This stage in the writ's history demonstrates the ability of courts to refashion time-honored
legal remedies to address contemporary problems, but often with
unintended side effects.
Finally, the Article will describe two reform proposals now
under consideration in Congress. In light of the continuing inability of the courts to resolve admitted problems in the process of
litigating habeas petitions, Congress has stepped into the fray. In
the summer of 1995, on the heels of similar action in the House of
Representatives, the Unites States Senate passed a dramatic revision of current habeas law. I will discuss why revising habeas
corpus practice is necessary to preserve the writ. In particular,
many of the problems that compelled the Supreme Court to reconfigure the writ into a writ of general error either no longer exist, or
are not as severe as they once might have been. It is my contention
that the writ is a poor means of challenging trial error, and, if concern about punishing the innocent is the writ's primary function,
better procedural tools may exist for achieving the same end.
I.

UNTANGLING THE HIsToRicAL WRIT:

EARLY HISTORY OF

HABEAS CoRpus
The Delegates to the Philadelphia Convention, in forbidding
Congress the authority to suspend habeas corpus except in cases of
national emergency, did not define the term "habeas corpus." The
Framers apparently thought that most Americans at the time would
readily understand the function of the legal remedy they were protecting. Seeking to divine the Framer's intent in protecting the
writ from suspension is not an easy undertaking. To understand
what the Framers were seeking to protect, it is important to trace
the common law origins of the writ and understand the nature
(and function) of the remedy.
A.

Habeas Corpus On English Soil: Common Law Development and
the Habeas Act of 1679
1.

Early History of the Writ

The writ of habeas corpus finds its ancestry in laws dating back
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to 1166 A.D. The Assize of Clarendon, an early legislative enactment of King Henry II, provides that:
And when a robber or murderer ... has been arrested... if the

justices are not about to come speedily enough into the country
where they have been taken, let the sheriffs send word to the
nearest justice by some well-informed person that they have arrested such men, and the justices shall send back word to the
sheriffs informing them where they desire the men to be
brought before them; and let the sheriffs bring them before the
justices. 4
Protecting individual liberty demanded that arrestees be brought
before a judge within a reasonable amount of time.5 Writs providing for the release of unlawfully imprisoned persons were well
known to courts of chancery and common law throughout the
fourteenth and fifteenth centuries.
Later, in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries, common law
courts invoked the writ in jurisdictional disputes with courts of
chancery, admiralty, and the Star Chamber.6 If a court lacked jurisdiction to hold a prisoner, it could issue habeas corpus to order the
prisoner's release. Common law courts used the writ effectively to
expand their jurisdiction, as well as to protect English citizens from
illegal imprisonment. Essentially, the writ conferred jurisdiction
on courts to inquire into the grounds of imprisonment. Blackstone explained that:
If any person be restrained of his liberty by order of any decree
of any illegal court, or by command of the King's majesty in person, or by warrant of the council board, or any privy council; he
shall upon demand of his counsel, have a writ of habeas corpus,
to bring his body before the court of King's bench or common
pleas; who shall determine whether the cause of his commitment be just, and thereupon do as to justice shall appertain.
And by the habeas corpus act [of 1679], the methods of obtaining this writ are plainly pointed out and enforced, that, so
long as this statute remains unimpeached, no subject of Engcases in
land can be long detained imprison, except in those
7
which the law requires and justifies such detainer.
English courts issued habeas corpus in the name of the crown,
and addressed the writ to a crown official or a lower court. The
4 ENGLISH HIsToRIcAL DocuMENTs 408 (David Douglas & George W. Greenway
eds., 1953).
5 Bracton's Note Book *85 (1887).

6 9 W. HOLDSWORTH, A HIs-roRy OF ENGLISH LAW 109 (2d
7 1 WILLiAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 131 (1st ed.

provided).

ed. 1938).
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court-ordered writ commanded the officers of the Crown to appear
before the court with the corpus (body) of the individual named in
the writ whom habeas (you have or you are holding) for purposes
stated in the writ. The writ of habeas corpus ad faciendum, subjiciendum et recipiendum, the subject of this article, ordered the
jailer to return with a prisoner for the purposes of "submitting" the
legal question of confinement to the court, of "receiving" its decision, and of "doing" what the court required with respect to the
prisoner.
While this early history is interesting, and sheds considerable
light upon the purpose of the original writ, it extends far beyond
the scope of this Article. Of importance to this inquiry is the later
development of the English common law, culminating in the enactment of the Habeas Act of 1679.
2.

Common Law Origins of the Writ

At common law, the writ of habeas corpus was employed as a
means to secure judicial review of the cause for pretrial imprisonment. The great English jurist Blackstone succinctly articulated
the need for the sacred writ:
To bereave a man of life... without accusation or trial, would
be so gross and notorious an act of despotism as must at once
convey the alarm of tyranny throughout the whole nation; but
confinement of the person, by secretly hurrying him to jail,
where his sufferings are unknown or forgotten, is a less public,
less striking, and 8therefore a more dangerous engine of arbitrary government.
What could be more fearful for the Crown's critics than a midnight knock upon the door by the King's agents? The hapless subject unlucky enough to run afoul of the King's pleasure, however,
could petition a court to issue a writ of habeas corpus, which would
force the custodian to produce the prisoner and to state the
grounds for his commitment. If the custodian could satisfactorily
explain the reasons for the person's confinement, such as the pendency of a criminal charge, the court could then either set bail (if
the offense was bailable) or order the prisoner detained pending
trial. If, however, the custodian could provide no legal basis for
holding the prisoner, the court could immediately order the prisoner's release.
Little wonder that the common law writ can only truly be understood in terms of the need for bail and the existence of a guar8 Id.at 136.
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antee of a speedy and public trial. Bail was a basic, and important,
right of Englishmen. Without habeas corpus, however, the opportunity for bail might never be invoked, and the horrors articulated
by Blackstone might come to pass.
The writ, however, was not available for one convicted of a
crime. A court would perfunctorily deny an application by a duly
convicted criminal because a conviction entered by a court of
proper jurisdiction would (at least on its face) provide a legally cognizable ground for keeping the person in prison. Contrary to the
somewhat inflated claims made on its behalf, the common law writ
of habeas corpus was simply a procedural mechanism by which an
individual could obtain judicial review of an unlawful executive detention. When the writ issued, the prisoner was not released, he
was merely brought before the court. The court, having inquired
into the grounds for imprisonment, could then order the individual's release, or recommit the prisoner to the executive.
3.

Refining the Writ: The Habeas Corpus Act of 1679

Procedural defects in the common law writ led Parliament, in
1679, to enact a general habeas corpus statute. Prior to the statute's adoption, courts were powerless to issue the writ while in vacation. The Crown not only exploited this defect, but also sought to
imprison citizens outside England, hence outside the writ's
jurisdiction.
The Habeas Act 9 provided generally that anyone arrested by
order of the King or Council would have immediate access to a writ
of habeas corpus,' ° and that habeas corpus "shall proceed to examine and determine whether the cause of such commitment appearing upon the... return be just and legal, or not ....

-11 This

greatly strengthened the power of common law courts to release
prisoners from unlawful arrests by extending habeas to review the
legal sufficiency of the avowed grounds of imprisonment. Persons
convicted of criminal offenses were, however, specifically excluded
from the statutory writ. 2
9 16 Car. I, C, 10, § VIII (1679).
10 BADSHAH K. MIAN, AMEwcAN HABEAs CoRpus: LAW, HISTORY, AND Pou-rcs 22-23
(1984).
11 16 Car. I, C, 10, § VIII.
12 Needless to say, the Crown was not pleased with the habeas statute. James II
failed in his effort to repeal the statute. Thereafter, the Crown sought to exploit the
Act's admitted procedural defects to pressure judges to impose excessive bails. WnLIAM F. DuKER, A CONSTrruTIONAL HISTORY OF HAB.As CoRPus 61 (1980).
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TransplantingHabeas Corpus: The Writ on American Soil
1.

Habeas Corpus in the Colonies

Although the common law writ was considered the heritage
and right of every Englishman it is unclear whether the American
colonists enjoyed the writ's benefits.13 Chalmers, discussing the
colonists' rights, noted that:
[t]hey had a right to possess every immunity which Englishmen,
within a distant and subordinate territory of the empire, can
possibly enjoy. They were entitled to personal security, to private property, and, what is of most importance to all, to personal
liberty; though the forgoing annals demonstrate that the two
first they enjoyed previously, the last they possessed not at all,
since the effectual remedy, the writ of habeas corpus, they did
not happily know. 4
Chalmers point is not entirely accurate. Confusion exists as to
whether the colonial courts entertained habeas petitions because
the Crown had not extended the 1679 Habeas Act to them, and
their colonial charters were silent as to habeas corpus. 15 As the
colonists considered themselves Englishmen, however, they believed themselves in possession of the rights generally enjoyed by
the English. Thus, despite Chalmer's assertion, records from that
period show that habeas petitions were entertained by the colonial
courts and that the colonies were to one degree or another ac6
quainted with the common law writ.'
While it is easy to assume that the colonial courts did not initially entertain habeas petitions, because the Crown had not formally extended the 1679 Act to American soil, it must be
remembered that the Habeas Corpus Act did not create the right to
habeas corpus, it merely cured various procedural defects in the
common law writ. Although the 1679 Habeas Corpus Act was not
initially extended to the North American colonies, habeas corpus
17
appeared to flourish in the colonies to one degree or another.
The need for the extension of the Habeas Act to the colonies
1S Carpenter, Habeas Corpus in the Colonies, 8 AM. HisT. REv. 18, 19-21, 25-26 (1903);
Oaks, Habeas Corpus in the States-1 776-1865, 32 U. CHi. L. REv. 243, 247 (1965).
14 1 Chalmers Annals 677.
15 Chaffee, The Most Important Right in the Constitution, 32 B.U.L. REv. 143, 146
(1952).
16 See Duker, supra note 12, at 110-116.
17 In 1651, for example, Sir George Yardly summoned a representative assembly
for the purpose of creating bylaws to govern the Virginia Colony. The assembly
adopted a compact providing that "all the inhabitants [of Virginia] shall ... have and
enjoy such freedoms and privileges as belong to the free borne people of England
.... " 1 VntGmn STATUTES AT LARGE 363-64 (William Henig ed., 1823)
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was not lost on the North Americans, however. Cotton Mather,
shortly after the 1679 Habeas Act became law, recommended that
Massachusetts' London agents secure the Act's benefits for the citizens of the colony. Mather wrote that without habeas corpus,
"[w]e [the Massachusetts colonists] are slaves ... ."1 The reference to slavery is particularly telling. Mather was directly referring
to the abominable condition of African-Americans who were held
in perpetual bondage without legal process or review. Slaves had
no right to habeas corpus. A colonist imprisoned without recourse to habeas relief thus became little more than a slave.
The Privy Council was unsympathetic and thwarted attempts
by the colonial legislatures of Massachusetts, New York, and Pennsylvania to enact habeas statutes. 9 Finally, with the Queen's consent, Governor Spotswood expressly extended 20the 1679 Habeas
Corpus Act to Virginia by a 1710 proclamation.
2.

Habeas Corpus as an Engine for Rebellion

The celebrated Wise case provides a useful illustration of the
need for, and function of, the habeas writ. In Massachusetts, the
executive council took upon itself the authority to levy and assess
taxes without the colonial legislature's consent. The citizens of Ipswich regarded the tax as an illegal imposition upon the power of
the legislature and, at a town meeting, resolved not to pay the assessments. The Reverend John Wise, the town minister, and several other prominent Ipswich citizens refused to pay the assessment
and were jailed on trumped-up charges of "contempt." Reverend
Wise and his compatriots were left to languish in jail without being
18 MASSACHUSETrS

HIsToc.rAL SocIETY CoLLEcTIONS, Series 4, vol. 8, at 390

(1684). English legal authorities apparently differed as to whether the common law,
and therefore habeas corpus, applied in the American colonies. Uninhabited countries, discovered by England, enjoyed the immediate application of the common law.
In a land conquered by England, however, or in territory ceded to it, the common law
did not apply unless explicitly extended by the Crown. See generally WALKER, THE
AMERICAN RECEPTION OF THE WRIT OF LIBERTY (1961).
19 Duker, supra note 12. A separate distinction occurred between the conquest of
a Christian Kingdom and the conquest of a so-called infidel's land. As Professor
Duker notes:
[o] nce the King extended the laws of England to the conquered Christian kingdom, no succeeding monarch could alter those laws without
the cooperation of Parliament. In the case of the conquest of the kingdom of an infidel .... the king, by himself,... [could adjudicate] any
matters that might arise there by the standard of "natural equity."
Id. at 95 (footnote omitted).
20 ROLLIN C. HuRD, A TREATISE ON THE RIGHT OF PERSONAL LIBERTY AND ON THE
WRIT OF HABEAS CoRPus 98-99 (1972).
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brought to trial. Wise, claiming the privileges secured him as an
Englishman by the Magna Carta and the common law, petitioned
for a writ of habeas corpus. Chief Judge Dudley denied the peticould not follow the colotion, asserting that the laws of England
21
nists "to the ends of the earth."
Revolutionary pamphleteers subsequently listed the denial of
the writ in the Wise case as one of the people's grievances against
the colonial government. 2 Wise illustrates the colonists' belief that
they enjoyed the common law rights of all Englishmen. The Wise
case further demonstrates the type of problem the writ was
designed to address: an illegal imprisonment without trial. The
Crown, if forced to prosecute the case before a jury or a (sympathetic) colonial judge could not be assured a conviction. It was
thus far easier simply to incarcerate the agitators on ill-defined
charges and hold them without proceeding to trial.
B.

The Revolutionary War and its Aftermath

Justice Story noted that
[i]t was under the consciousness of the full possession of the
rights, liberties and immunities of British subjects, that the colonists in almost all the early legislation of their respective assemblies, insisted upon a declaratory act, acknowledging and
confirming them.23
To this end, by the time of the Revolutionary War, several of the
newly established states (including North Carolina, South Caro24
lina, and Virginia) had acts affirming the habeas corpus writ.
As their rights and liberties became threatened, the colonists
collectively reasserted them. Assembling at New York in 1765, the
Congress of the Nine Colonies declared that the colonists were
"entitled to all the inherent right and liberties of [the King's] natu25
ral born subjects, within the kingdom of Great Britain."
By this time, habeas corpus had become deeply ingrained in
American legal thought. Attempts to deny the writ evoked a hostile response from the colonists. The development of habeas practice in the American colonies proceeded in much the same fashion
as it had occurred generations earlier in Britain. The colonists
21 EMORY WASHBURN, SKETCHES OF THE JUDICIAL HIsToRY OF MASSACHUSETTS

(1840).

116

22 Hurd, supra note 20, at 111.
23 1 STORY CONST., § 165.
24 See, e.g., Act of Dec. 12, 1712, 2 S.C. Stat. 399 (Cooper 1837); see also Duker,
supra note 12, at 106.
25 Hutch. Hist. Mass. Bay, Appendix F.
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feared imprisonment without trial. They did not fear colonial juries. The "Great Writ" was thus exercised as a means of challenging the Crown's authority to arrest, not the authority of a judge or
jury to convict.
The Continental Congress of 1774, to which only Georgia refused to send a delegate, composed a Declaration of Rights that
reaffirmed the colonists claim to the "rights, liberties and immunities of free and natural-born subjects within the realm of England."26 This declaration occurred near the same time as the
Quebec Act of 1774, in which England attempted to deny the
habeas corpus writ to Quebec colonists.
The Quebec Act 27 figures prominently in the Declaration of

Independence, in which the rebels condemned George III
for abolishing the free system of English laws in the neighboring
Province, establishing therein an Arbitrary government, and enlarging it Boundaries so as to render it at once an example and
fit instrument for introducing the same absolute rule to these
colonies.
The colonists affirmed the belief that the common law, hence
habeas corpus, should apply to all the King's domains.
C. Habeas Corpus and the New American States

The common-law writ of habeas corpus was recognized
throughout the thirteen American colonies at the time they broke
free from British rule. After the colonies claimed their independence from England, however, and created a common union, the
enactment of a federal habeas corpus act to protect against a centralized power lost its urgency. The newly created states retained
executheir sovereign authority and had little fear of a centralized
21
Confederation.
of
Articles
the
tive or legislature under
After all, the writ's development in the seventeenth century
was primarily "in response to arbitrary executive power. "29 The
26 ROLLIN

C. HURD,A

TREATISE ON THE RIGHT OF PERSONAL LIBERTY AND ON THE

WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND THE PRACTICE CONNECTED wrrH IT: WITH A VIEW OF THE
LAW OF EXTRADImON OF FUGrrrVES 107 (1858).

27 While the writ was not specifically mentioned in the Declaration itself, among
the causes the American colonists listed "which impel [led] them to Separation" were:
"[flor depriving us, in many Cases, of the Benefits of Trial byJury; For transporting us
beyond Seas to be tried for pretended Offences." Suspension of habeas corpus would
enable the King to arbitrarily imprison colonists and extradite them to England for
trial in English courts, or, more likely, to leave in prison without trial. 1 THE FoUNDERS' CONSTITUTION 9, 10 (Philip B. Kurkland & Ralph Lerner eds., 1987).
28 Duker, supra note 12, at 127.
29 Id. at 116.
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absence of a centralized executive authority obviated the need for
either spelling out the writ in the Articles of Confederation, or adding it to the new state constitutions. A federal writ of habeas
corpus was unnecessary because no national courts with general
jurisdiction had been created and the writ was provided for in
some form in all of the states.3 0 A citizen could thus rely upon the
common law writ as developed in the states to protect himself from
the threat of illegal imprisonment.
The adoption of the Constitution in 1789, which created a
comparatively powerful central executive and established a national court system, led the Framers to include the Suspension
Clause in the new Constitution. Opponents to the Constitution's
ratification asserted that the failure of the delegates to adopt a bill
of rights placed Americans' liberties in jeopardy.3
In answering that argument, Alexander Hamilton explained
that the new Constitution contained structural provisions that
would guarantee well-established common law rights. Among
those provisions, Hamilton observed that the writ of habeas corpus,
along with the prohibition against ex post facto laws and the refusal to grant tiles of nobility, "are perhaps greater securities to
liberty and republicanism than any it [the Constitution]
32
contains."
Doubtless, Americans were aware of the role habeas corpus
played in seditious libel cases. The fear existed that a powerful national government would engender the creation of a powerful,
hence corruptible, executive, or that a national legislature would
attempt to seize power at the expense of the states. Hamilton appreciated those concerns. He observed that "the practice of arbitrary imprisonments have been, in all ages, the favorite and most
formidable instruments of tyranny."3 3 To Hamilton, the antidote
to the arbitrary imprisonment, or imprisonment lacking legal
grounds and without benefit of trial, was the writ of habeas corpus.
D.

Habeas Corpus and the Constitution
On May 29, 1787, only four days after the Philadelphia Con-

30 The Northwest Ordinance, enacted on July 13, 1787, expressly provides that
"It]he inhabitants of the said territory shall always be entitled to the benefits of the
writs of habeas corpus, and of the trial byjury .... " THE FOUNDERS' CONSTITUTION,
supra note 27, at 28.
31 THE FEDERALIST No. 84, at 510 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed.,
1961).
32 Id. at 511.
33 Id. at 512.
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vention was called to order, Charles Pinckney of South Carolina
submitted his Draughtof a FederalGovernment. Pinckney's document
provided for, among other things, a federal writ of habeas
corpus.'M Convention documents do not record any debate surrounding Pinckney's original proposal to include habeas corpus in
the Constitution.
Habeas corpus is next mentioned in Convention records on
August 20, when Pinckney proposed inclusion of the following
language:
The privileges of and benefits of the writ of habeas corpus shall
be enjoyed in this government in the most expeditious and ample manner: and shall not be suspended by the legislature except upon the most urgent and pressing35 occasion and for a time
period not exceeding [blank] months.
The phrase "in this government" seems to imply that the proposed writ would extend to prisoners of the federal government.
Rather than spelling out what the writ entailed, the Framers instead chose to include language preventing Congress from suspending the writ. While this may seem strange, it would appear
that the Framers were well acquainted with the writ. Its operation
and purpose was likely well understood by all the Convention Delegates. What the Framers feared, in drafting the new Constitution,
was that the national legislature would try to suspend the writ's operation in the states.
The Suspension Clause tracks the Pinckney proposal. Hence,
the Constitution provides that "the privilege of the writ of habeas
corpus shall not be suspended."3 6 The Constitution, like the
Habeas Act of 1679, did not create habeas corpus, nor did it define
habeas; rather, it affirmed the existence of the common law writ by
promising that habeas corpus could not be suspended.
Recognizing that habeas corpus might need to be suspended
during certain critical times, however, the Framers added, by a vote
of seven states to three, the qualifying proviso: "unless in cases of
rebellion or invasion the public safety may require it." This proposal, introduced by Governor Morris, was a reworking of Charles
Pinckney's original proposal to the Committee on Detail, and
sparked the only debate on the writ. The debate focused not on
34

3

THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF

1787 604-09 (Max Farrand ed.,

1966).
35

2 TIE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 341 (Max Farrand ed.,

1966).
36

U.S.

CONST.,

art.

1, § 9, c. 2.
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whether a clause including the writ should be incorporated in the
Constitution but, rather, on whether the Suspension Clause was
necessary and, if so, how it might be worded to grant the maximum
amount of protection to the citizen without jeopardizing the security of the country in the event of a national emergency.
E.

Divining the Framer'sIntent

To frame the debate surrounding habeas corpus, one must
understand the nature of the procedural remedy the Framers were
seeking to protect. Habeas corpus, as a legal remedy, was well understood by the Framers. Indeed, it is fairly clear what sort of
habeas corpus the Framers contemplated: a writ to protect citizens
against illegal imprisonment. In the Federalist papers, Alexander
Hamilton provides the Convention's rationale for adopting the
Suspension Clause. Arguing against the need for a bill of rights,
Hamilton asserted that recognition of the habeas writ would provide ample protection against illegal imprisonment. Quoting
Blackstone, Hamilton wrote:
To bereave a man of life ... without accusation or trial,would be
so gross and notorious an act of despotism as must at once convey the alarm of tyranny throughout the whole nation; but confinement of the person, by secretly hurrying him to jail, where
his sufferings are unknown or forgotten, is a less public, less
striking, and3 7therefore a more dangerous engine of arbitrary
government.
Hamilton's attempt to allay the fears of his fellow citizeng did
not focus on obtaining a correct verdict, but on preserving the
right to trial. The fear expressed by opponents to the Constitution
was that the citizens of Massachusetts or Virginia could be imprisoned by a national authority and held without trial. This view is
buttressed by the fact that Hamilton's argument did not carry the
day. Proponents of a bill of rights prevailed, and chief among the
rights protected was that of a speedy and public jury trial.
This view is borne out, at least in part, by the Judiciary Act of
1789, which established the inferior federal courts. Prior to the
Judiciary Act's adoption, habeas corpus remained largely a matter
of state adjudication. The Judiciary Act, however, expressly authorized the newly formed federal courts to issue "writs of scire facias,
habeas corpus ....
And that either the justices of the Supreme
Court as well as the judges of the District Courts, shall have power
37

THE

FEDERALIST

ComENTARms

No. 84,

supra note 31, at 512 (quoting WiutLti

136 (1st ed., 1768)).
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to grant writs of habeas corpus for the purpose of an inquiry into
the cause of commitment."38 The legislative history contains no
record of debate over the decision to authorize federal courts to
issue habeas writs. Presumably, the Act's framers believed that federal courts, like the state courts, would possess the inherent authority to issue the writ.
Congress, mindful of the need to prevent federal interference
with state courts, restricted federal jurisdiction to issue the writ.
The federal habeas writ would not "extend to prisoners in gaol,
unless where they are in custody, under or by colour of the authority of the United States, or are committed for trial before some
court of the same, or are necessary to be brought into court to
testify." 9 The federal judiciary thus had no authority to issue writs
to citizens imprisoned in state courts. Conversely, state courts retained the authority to issue habeas writs to challenge the validity
of a federal commitment.
II.

HABEAS

CORPUS AND THE CIVIL WAR

Habeas practice underwent little change until the Civil War
period. The Civil War not only changed the American identity, but
transformed American legal thinking as well. The fear of an omnipotent central authority evaporated in the flames of Atlanta. Independent states became the enemy, the Union the savior. It is
not unsurprising that habeas, designed to protect the citizen
against abuses by the executive, was refashioned to protect the citizen against the individual state. The fears of the survivors of the
Civil War were not the same as the fears of the Framers.
A. Suspension of the Writ During the Civil War
Shortly after his election, President Abraham Lincoln was
faced with rebellion in the southern states. During only the second
month of his presidency, Lincoln delivered a letter to General Winfield Scott, authorizing the suspension of habeas corpus in certain
areas. The letter set forth the reasons for taking action against the
rebels and outlined a suggested plan of action. Among other
things, the President identified "the bombardment of their cities
and, in the extremist necessity, the suspension of the writ of habeas
38 1 Stat. 81-82 (1789).
39 The Supreme Court in Ex parte Dorr, 3 How. 103, 105 (1845), construed this
provision to bar absolutely federal habeas corpus review for a party convicted in state
court.
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corpus"'40 as measures that might need to be undertaken. 4 ' Ostensibly, suspension of habeas corpus was necessary to hold prisoners
indefinitely without bringing them before a possibly sympathetic
jury. The writ the President was seeking to abrogate was not one
challenging a conviction; rather a challenge to the legal sufficiency
of the incarceration. Indeed, the President consistently defended
his actions on the basis of the need for preventative detention.4"
Although it was unclear whether the President could unilaterally suspend the writ, Congress ultimately ceded to Lincoln's request and granted him suspension authority.4"
B.

The 1867 Habeas Corpus Act

After the Civil War, Congress enacted the Habeas Corpus Act
of 1867. That Act, which became law on February 5, 1867, empowered federal judges, acting "within their respective jurisdictions" to
issue writs of habeas corpus "in all cases where any person may be
restrained of his or her liberty in violation of the constitution, or of
any treaty or law of the United States,"' 4 without any requirement
of federal custody. This represented a shift from the 1789 Act,
which limited federal habeas exclusively to federal prisoners.
Congress passed the 1867 Act, in part, in response to a House
resolution of December 19, 1865, directing its Judiciary Committee
to inquire and report to this House ... what legislation is necessary to enable the courts of the United States to enforce the
freedom of the wives and children of soldiers of the United
States ... and also to enforce the liberty of all persons under the
operation of the constitutional amendment abolishing slavery.45
The Thirteenth Amendment abolished slavery and involuntary
servitude except as punishment for a crime of which the person
was duly convicted. Former slaves held in violation of the Thirteen
Amendment could use habeas corpus to determine the legitimacy
of the reason for the involuntary servitude. If, as the Amendment
states, the servitude was "punishment for a crime whereof the party
40

6

41

Id.

RICHARDS, MESSAGES AND PAPERS OF THE PRESIDENT

17 (1900).

42 Before Congress enacted legislation permitting suspension of the writ, the President had authorized its suspension in eight separate instances. The final occasion
extended to all "rebels and insurgents, their aiders and abettors within the United
States, and all persons discouraging volunteer enlistments, resisting militia drafts, or
guilt of any disloyal practice, affording aid and comfort to rebels against the authority
of the United States." 16 COLLECTED WoRMs OF LINCOLN 260, 266 (1953-55).
43 12 Star. 755 (1861).
44 14 Star. 385 (1867).
45 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 87 (1865).
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shall have been duly convicted,"' the grounds for confinement
would have been legally sufficient. If, however, the person applying for the writ was simply a former slave, hence illegally imprisoned, the writ could be used to order the release of the now
emancipated slave.
To this end, a bill was introduced in the House "to secure the
writ of Habeas Corpus to persons held in slavery of involuntary servitude contrary to the Constitution of the United States."4 7 The
initial version of the bill provided that
all persons who are held in slavery or involuntary servitude
otherwise than for crime whereof they are convicted shall be discharged on Habeas Corpus issued by and returnable before any
court or judge of the United States.'
Representative William Lawrence of Ohio introduced a revised version of this legislation in the House. His bill provided that
"in addition to the authority already conferred by law, [the federal
courts] shall have the power to grant the writ of habeas corpus in
all cases where any person may be restrained of his or her liberty in
violation of the Constitution, or of any treaty or law of the united
States."49 Lawrence intended the phrase "any person . . . restrained of his or her liberty" to apply exclusively to former slaves.
Unlike the person illegally imprisoned by the state, the unfortunate person bound in slavery was not confined by the executive,
but by a private party. Certainly, the confinement occurred under
the protection of state law, but nonetheless involved not a governmental action, but a private one. The broadened language thus
served to put an end to attempts by the former slave states to defy
the Emancipation Proclamation by enacting harsh apprenticeship
or contract labor laws that were thinly veiled efforts to curtail the
liberties of those citizens recently freed from the tyranny of slavery.
The only significant House debate on the bill came in an objection to a provision that made habeas inapplicable to persons
held by military authorities or those charged with acts of rebellion
during the Civil War. Representative Lawrence observed that the
bill was not intended to apply to persons in military custody. He
explained that the bill was designed to respond to the concerns of
the December 19 Resolution, which addressed the needs of the
46 U.S. CONST. amend. XIII.
47 The original of this bill was not printed. The handwritten draft is available in

the National Archives.
48 See supra note 47.
49 H.R. 605, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. (1866).
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wives and children of United States soldiers and persons under the
protection of the Thirteenth Amendment. With little additional
debate, the House passed the legislation.50
Senator Lyman Trumbull of Illinois, chairman of the judiciary
Committee, introduced the House bill by request. Trumbull explained that
the habeas corpus act of 1789, to which this bill is amended,
confines the jurisdiction of the united States courts in issuing
writs of habeas corpus to persons who are held under United
States laws. Now, a person might be held under a State law in
violation of the Constitution and laws of the United States, and
he ought to have in such case the benefit of the writ, and we
agree that he ought to have recourse to the United States courts
to show that he was illegally imprisoned in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States."
Trumbull did not focus on the plight of former slaves; rather, he
read the bill's language forthrightly as applying to all citizens deprived of their freedom. Trumbull's understanding of the bill's
purpose differed from that offered in the House. Some commentators have opined that Trumbull was unfamiliar with the context
in which the legislation was drafted; hence his differing explanation as to the bill's purpose.52 In any event, the bill passed the
Senate the very next session without significant debate.5"
In light of the debate (or lack thereof) surrounding floor consideration of the bill, it is difficult to determine the scope Congress
intended the statute to have. Professor Lewis Mayers has argued
that Congress intended the Habeas Act to apply exclusively to
emancipated slaves who were being denied liberty.' Mayers contends that Congress did not intend or anticipate that the Act would
be used to provide a broad federal remedy for all state prisoners.
Nevertheless, the Act's broad, somewhat ambiguous language,
coupled with the absence of Committee reports and. serious floor
debate, led to later expansive interpretations by the courts. Indeed, Senator Trumbull's floor statement presaged the broader application courts would read into the Act. Shortly after the bill was
read on the Senate floor, questions arose concerning the bill's in50 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 4150-51 (1866).
51 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 4229 (1866).
52 See, e.g., Lewis Mayers, The Habeas Corpus Act of 1867: The Supreme Court as Legal
Historian, 33 U. CHI. L. REv. 31, 38-40 (1965).
58 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 2d Sess. 730, 790 (1866).
54 Mayers, supra note 52, at 43-48 (1965); see also Report to the Attorney General
on Federal Habeas Corpus Review of State Judgments, reprinted in 22 U. MicH. J. L.
REFoRM, 901, 923-24 (1989).
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tended purpose. Trumbull, although confessing his ignorance of
the legislation's finer points, explained that the bill restricts the
jurisdiction of the United States courts to issuing habeas writs to
persons held under United States law. How did he define such a
person? As "a person.., held under a State law in violation of the
Constitution and laws of the United States." Such persons, Trumbull observed "ought to have in such a case the benefit of the writ
...

he ought to have recourse to the United States courts to show

that he is illegally imprisoned in violation of the Constitution or
laws of the United States."55 He did not read any limitation into
the bill's language.
Senator Trumbull's explanation of the bill's purported scope
is at odds with that offered in the House. Whether or not Trumbull understood the legislation's intended purposes, however, it is
not unreasonable to conclude that his explanation informed and
influenced not only his own vote, but the vote of others who were
listening.
Despite the supposed (if one accepts Mayers' argument) restriction of the Habeas Act to former slaves, the Act nonetheless
represented something of a legal innovation. State law prisoners
were empowered to seek a federal remedy for unlawful imprisonment by a state court. A federal court was granted the power to
intervene in a state judicial proceeding and issue a writ of habeas
corpus for a person held in violation of federal law.
While the Framers of the Constitution and the Judiciary Act of
1789 were principally concerned with abuses by the federal government, and so crafted legislation enabling states to issue habeas
writs for federal prisoners, the drafters of the 1867 Act worried
about state infringement upon federal rights. The Framers had
good cause to fear a powerful centralized executive, while the
drafters of the 1867 Act had equally good cause to fear the rebellious states. The Suspension Clause and the 1867 Act thus can only
be understood if one has an appreciation for the events surrounding their enactment-the Revolutionary War and adoption of a
federal constitution and the Civil War and reconstruction.
Decoupling the 1867 Habeas Act from the Civil War is impossible.
"Reconstruction" referred not simply to rebuilding the South, but
also to reconstructingthe Union. The federal government became
the primary tool by which reconstruction was to take place; thus, it
was only logical that federal remedies should be supplied for violations of federal rights.
55 CONG. GLOBE, 39th Cong., 1st Sess. 4229 (1866).
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C. Limitations on the Writ
Despite the broad application of federal habeas, certain limitations remained. Imprisonment pursuant to the judgment of a state
court of competent jurisdiction was not held to be in violation of
law for purposes of either federal or state habeas corpus remedies.5 6 That remained true even if thejudgment was based on legal
error. The only post-conviction habeas challenge courts would entertain was that predicated on a jurisdictional defect. 7
While the limitations placed on habeas review might seem a
bit odd to the modem student of criminal procedure, it must be
remembered that criminal defendants enjoyed few rights of appeal-much less post-conviction collateral relief-in the nation's
early years. The Judiciary Act of 1789 made no provision for appeal in criminal cases. Although Congress later that same year provided for direct appeal to circuit courts in a limited number of
criminal cases, even then the Supreme Court could not review a
criminal conviction. The high court even lacked the authority to
hear a claim that the statute under which a defendant was convicted violated the Constitution. 58 Not until 1802 did Congress authorize the courts of appeals to certify questions to the Supreme
Court, and even then only when a division of opinion existed.5 9 It
would be novel, indeed, if the drafters of the 1867 Act had intended a person convicted in state court to petition for habeas
corpus based on a duly imposed conviction.
D. JudicialExpansion of the Habeas Remedy
Senator Trumbull's allegedly misguided explanation-flawed
or not-has won the day. 60 Federal courts have extended the
reach of habeas corpus to all state prisoners, even those convicted
by ajury of their peers in a court of competentjurisdiction. Professor Paul Bator has traced the writ's expansion from a limited review of jurisdictional issues, to a sweeping review of all federal
statutory and constitutional issues by the mid-1940s in order to
demonstrate the veracity of Judge Friendly's observation that the
56 See Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. 193, 202-03 (1830); Paul Bator, Finality in Criminal
Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 76 HAxv. L. REv. 441, 466, 474-75
(1963); Oaks, supra note 13, at 262.
57 See, e.g., Ex parte Watkins, 28 U.S. at 201-03; Oaks, supra note 13, at 261-62.
58 Act of March 3, 1789, ch. 176, 20 Stat. 354.
59 Act of April 29, 1802, ch. 31, 2 Stat. 159.
60 Bator, supra note 56, at 482-84,. 495-96.
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writ has, like a Virginia creeper, expanded stealthily to strangle judicial administration.
1.

Federal Cases Involving Federal Prisoners

With respect to federal prisoners, the Supreme Court had
long declined to entertain post-conviction habeas applications, except when jurisdictional defects were asserted. In Ex parte Watkins,61 for example, the Court refused to consider a habeas
application from a petitioner who alleged that he had been convicted pursuant to a defective indictment. The Court explained
A judgment, in its nature, concludes the subject on which it is
rendered, and pronounces the law of the case. Thejudgment of
a court of record whose jurisdiction is final, is as conclusive on
all the world as the judgment of this court would be ....It puts
an end to the inquiry concerning the fact, by deciding it ....
An imprisonment under a judgment cannot be unlawful, unless
that judgment be an absolute nullity; and it is not a nullity if the
court has general jurisdiction of the subject, although it should
be erroneous.6 2
The concept of jurisdictional defect, however, took on a new
meaning in the post-Civil War Court. In Ex parte Siebold,65 the
Court held that a conviction based on an unconstitutional statute
could be challenged on a habeas petition. The Court reasoned
that "[a]n unconstitutional law is void, and is as no law."' The
Court erected its decisions on jurisdictional grounds, observing
that "if the laws are unconstitutional and void, the Circuit Court
acquired no jurisdiction of the causes."65 In other words, an unconstitutional statute could not confer jurisdiction upon a court to
hear and decide a case. Absent such a jurisdictional hook,
throughout most of the nineteenth century, the Supreme Court
refused to hear challenges to convictions rendered by courts of
66
competent jurisdiction on habeas petitions.
2.

State Prisoners and the Federal Writ

Prior to the Civil War, state prisoners had no recourse to federal habeas relief. That changed, however, after the adoption of
the 1867 Habeas Corpus Act. The expansion of habeas corpus
61 28 U.S. 193 (1830).
62 Id. at 202-03.
63 100 U.S. 371 (1879).
64 Id. at 376.
65 Id. at 377.
66 Bator, supra note 56,

at 471-74, 483-84.
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from a pretrial procedural check on illegal imprisonments occurred in three stages. At first, federal courts granted habeas to
state prisoners only on the basis of ajurisdictional defect (narrowly
defined) or an illegal pretrial imprisonment. Federal review of
state court decisions, however, dramatically expanded to encompass scrutiny of the adequacy of state judicial proceedings. With
the later increase in substantive rights claimed under the federal
constitution, habeas review metamorphosed into a quasi-appellate
review, loosed from its traditional underpinnings.
a.

The Writ Limited: JurisdictionalDefects and FederalHabeas
Review

The 1867 Habeas Act represented a remarkable legal innovation-in some respects, a transformation nearly as profound as
that of the Fourteenth Amendment. State prisoners, for the first
time, could rely upon a federal courts to defend their constitutional rights against the state governments. While the 1867 Act
permitted state prisoners to petition federal courts for habeas relief, however, the Act provided no guidance as to the deference
due either prior, or pending, state criminal proceedings. The Act's
silence on that fundamental issue is troubling. Were state criminal
justice proceedings simply to stop until the federal issue had been
settled?
If one accepts the view that the Act was to apply only to emancipated slaves, this lack of procedural guidance makes some sense.
A person kept in a condition of slavery by a private slave holder
(whether acting under a state law or not), would employ federal
habeas to free herself from that condition of servitude. No state
judicial proceedings would be pending. The question of deferring
to a state judicial proceeding would thus not be implicated.
Interestingly, if state authorities sought to violate a citizen's
federal rights, habeas corpus was not the legal tool by which to
assert a claim. The Civil Rights Act of 1866 dealt with the problem
of parallel state proceedings by expressly authorizing the removal
of state proceedings to federal court.67 In this way, the limited
range of federally protected rights could be guaranteed in federal
courts without interfering in the state judicial process.
Habeas corpus litigation represented a different problem. A
state prisoner asserting a violation of federal law had no cause to
remove his case to federal court; thus, the state action remained
67

Civil Rights Act of 1866, 39th Cong., 1st Sess., ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27.
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pending. Once the Supreme Court took the step of reviewing the
adequacy of state legal proceedings, thereby inserting federal
courts into the state judicial process, something needed to be done
with the pending state adjudication. In an effort to forestall the
potential procedural quagmire created by federal review of an
ongoing state cause, the Supreme Court held in Ex parte Royal3 '
that a federal court should not issue a habeas writ until the state
tribunal had the opportunity to consider the petitioner's federal
claims.
Petitioner Royall was indicted on state charges for selling a tax
receivable coupon without a license.6 9 Royall argued that the Virginia law violated Article I, Section 10 of the Constitution and was
therefore "null and void."7 The federal circuit court denied
Royall's petition, believing it lacked jurisdiction. 7 1 Royall then petitioned the Supreme Court, presenting the question whether the
federal courts had jurisdiction to issue a habeas writ to a person
indicted pursuant to a state law that allegedly violated the
Constitution.7 2
The Supreme Court found that whenever an unconstitutional
law deprived the state court of jurisdiction, the circuit court had
the authority to issue a habeas writ and discharge the prisoner
from state custody.73 In effect, the federal court was not intruding
upon state proceedings because the state court lacked jurisdiction
to hear the cause. Sensitive to the authority of the state courts,
however, the Supreme Court ruled that circuit courts need not exercise that supervisory power in every instance.7 4 The Court
observed:
We cannot suppose that Congress intended to compel those
courts... to draw to themselves, in the first instance, the control
of all criminal prosecutions commenced in state courts exercising authority within the same territorial limits, where the accused claims that he is held in custody in violation of the
Constitution of the United States. The injunction to hear the
case summarily, and thereupon to "dispose of the party as law
and justice require," does not deprive the court of discretion as
to the time and mode in which it will exert the power conferred
upon it. That discretion should be exercised in light of the rela68
69
70

71
72
73
74

117 U.S. 241 (1886).
Id. at 242.

Id.
Id.

Id. at 245.
Id. at 249.
Id. at 251.
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tions existing, under our system of government, between the judicial tribunals of the Union and of the States, and in
recognition of the fact that the public good requires that those
relations be not disturbed by unnecessary conflict between
courts equally
bound to guard and protect rights secured by the
75

constitution.

In effect, the Court was demonstrating that it would defer to state
adjudications at its own discretion. This discretion, informed by
the principle of comity, could be overridden by any special circumstances that required immediate federal action. As Royall's case
involved no such special circumstances, the Court denied his petition and affirmed the circuit court's ruling.7 6
Nevertheless, Ex parte Royall and its progeny gave rise to the
requirement that a petitioner exhaust all available state remedies
before seeking federal review. 77 This so-called exhaustion doctrine
is grounded in the principle of comity and the understanding that
state courts, like federal courts, are required to uphold and enforce constitutional requirements.
The Supreme Court also grounded its reasoning in the hubris
of jurisdictional defect. As an unconstitutional state law could not
confer jurisdiction upon a state court, a federal court was well
within its prerogative to issue a habeas writ. The Court refused to
abandon, at least in principle, its jurisdictional defect rhetoric. In
Ex parte Friedreich,78 decided the same year as Ex parte Royall, the
Court observed that the habeas corpus proceeding was "a collateral
attack, of a civil nature, to impeach the validity of a judgment or
sentence of another court " 79 and not a proceeding for the correction of errors."0 Absent a jurisdictional defect, the Court found
that the violation of a person's rights during the course of a state
judicial proceeding simply did not provide grounds for federal
habeas relief."1
In In re Wood,82 the petitioner, an African-American, was convicted in a New York state court. Petitioner Wood alleged the
grand jury that returned his indictment and the petitjury that tried
Id.
Id. at 254.
77 See Ex Parte Royall, 117 U.S. 241 (1886) (developing the exhaustion requirement now embodied in 28 U.S.C. §§ 2254(b), (c)).
78 149 U.S. 70 (1893).
75

76

79

Id. at 76.

80 Id. at 75.
81 See Bator, supra note 56, at 478-84.
82 140 U.S. 278 (1891).
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him were drawn from discriminatory lists."5 The process used to
generate those lists, petitioner asserted, systematically excluded African-Americans and therefore could not withstand a constitutional
challenge.8 4 On that basis, Wood moved for a new trialA- After his
motion was dismissed, Wood petitioned the federal district court
for habeas relief.8 6 The petition was summarily denied.8 7 In affirming the lower court's denial of the petition, Justice Harlan observed that Wood had failed to argue that the New York statute
regulating jury selection was unconstitutional.8 8 While Justice
Harlan agreed that discriminatory practice in jury selection was
surely unconstitutional, whether such discrimination existed was "a
question which the trial court was entirely competent to decide,
and its determination could not be reviewed . . .upon a writ of
habeas corpus, without making that writ serve the purposes of a
writ of error."8 9
Justice Harlan drew a careful distinction between a general
writ of error, and the more limited writ of habeas corpus. 90 State
courts, the Justice pointed out, had often decided questions involving the construction of the Constitution and the "determination of
rights asserted under it."9 1 A state court's ability to construe the
Constitution, however, did not "justify an interference with its proceedings ...upon a writ of habeas corpus... either during or after
the trial in the state court."9" The Court explained that
[i]f the question of the exclusion of citizens of the African race
from the lists of grand and petit jurors had been made during
the trial and erroneously decided against the appellant, such error in decision would not have made the judgment of conviction
void, or his detention under it illegal ....
The Court concluded that an error of that sort would not have
authorized the court of appeals "upon writ of habeas corpus, to
review the decision or disturb the custody"9 4 of the prisoner.
Rather, the Court explained, "[t]he remedy ... was to sue out a
Id. at
Id.
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
91 Id. at
83
84
85
86
87
88
89
90

279.
279-80.
280.
283.
288-89.
286.
286-87.
286.

92

Id.

93
94

Id. at 287.
Id.
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writ of error from this court."9 5 The Court sought not to discredit
the petitioner's claim, but to apply the proper remedy to the problem presented. Doubtless, had the underlying New York statute
been unconstitutional, the Court would have issued the writ. Absent a jurisdictional defect, however, the only way in which the
Court was willing to proceed was through a writ of error.
The Court's desire to force petitioners to exhaust state remedies underscores a fundamental recognition that state judges were
fully competent to adjudicate federal questions. As Professor Bator
has noted: "[i]t would make little sense to encourage the use of
state remedial processes through a requirement of exhaustion only
in order to ignore these processes on collateral attack."9 6 The effort was designed to enable the state courts to review the issues
presented and then, if an incorrect decision were reached, the
Supreme Court could then make a correction via a writ of error.
b.

The Writ Expanded: FederalScrutiny of State Judicial
Proceedings

Hard cases, as every first-year law student learns, make bad
laws. And so it was with the infamous cases of Frank v. Magnum9 7
and Moore v. Dempsey.98 These cases mark the Supreme Court's
abandonment of the jurisdictional hook generally found in prior
habeas cases and the decision to permit federal courts to review the
adequacy of state judicial processes.
In 1913, Leo Frank, a Jewish businessman, was convicted of
murdering a 13-year-old girl named Mary Phagan.9 9 Phagan
worked for Frank at an Atlanta pencil factory. At trial, testimony
elicited from Jim Conley, another employee at the pencil factory,
suggested that Frank had accidentally killed Miss Phagan when she
resisted his sexual advances. 10 0 Conley claimed to have helped
Frank carry the girl's body to the factory's basement. He also testified that Frank had directed him to write several notes designed to
mislead police investigators about the perpetrator's identity. The
prosecution also proffered physical evidence-blood and hair samples-taken from a room across the hall from Frank's office. The
case was hardly open and shut, however, because Conley's testimony was not considered credible by many court-watchers.
95 Id.
96

Bator, supra note 56, at 483.

97 237 U.S. 309 (1915).

98 261 U.S. 86 (1923).
99 Frank, 237 U.S. at 311.

100 LEONARD DINNERSTEN, THE LEO FRANK CASE 40-48 (1968).
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Public sentiment, fueled by anti-Semitism, ran against Frank,
and threatening mobs gathered around the courthouse. The trial
judge feared that if Frank were acquitted, the mob would lynch
him. Purportedly concerned about the violence that might erupt,
the judge prevented Frank from attending the reading of the verdict. Despite Conley's inconsistent, and sometimes contradictory,
testimony, the jury had little trouble convicting Frank. After his
conviction and death sentence, Frank's request for a new trial and
his state appeals were denied. The Georgia Supreme Court ultimately upheld his sentence, finding that the seemingly gross irregularities in the trial were not prejudicial.1"' Frank then petitioned
the United States Supreme Court, asserting that relief on federal
habeas should be available because his murder conviction was the
result of a mob dominated trial and he was forced to be absent
when the jury verdict was returned. Frank framed his petition in
the context of a jurisdictional defect, claiming that the mob domination divested the trial court ofjurisdiction, thereby voiding the
conviction.
The Supreme Court rejected Frank's argument, noting that he
had failed to establish that he had been denied due process under
law. With a nod towards the jurisdictional defect jurisprudence,
the Court observed that a due process violation would constitute a
jurisdictional defect because the Fourteenth Amendment expressly
forbids the state authority to deprive a person of life or liberty without due process of law. 10 2 "[W]e may not," the Court stated, "review irregularities or erroneous rulings upon the trial, however
serious, and that the writ of habeas corpus will lie only in case the
judgment under which the prisoner is detained is shown to be absolutely void for want of jurisdiction in the court that pronounced
3
0

it."'

By virtue of the fact that petitioner's contentions were considered (and rejected) by the state tribunals, the Supreme Court
found no due process violation. Accordingly, the Court rejected
Frank's petition. The door, however, was left open for greater expansion of the writ's application. The Court emphasized that the
state judicial proceedings as a whole had to be evaluated, with special consideration given to the state's "corrective process" for addressing trial defects alleged by the petitioner. Arguably then, if a
101

Frank, 237 U.S. at 338.
See id. at 326-28, 331-32.
103 Id. at 327.
102
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state did not have a formal process to address constitutional claims
raised by a prisoner, the federal court could issue the writ.
Eight years later, in Moore v. Dempsey, the Supreme Court invoked Frank v. Magnum's reasoning in ruling that another mobdomination claim could be reviewed on habeas corpus. 10 4 In
Moore, a number of African-Americans peacefully assembled in
their church were attacked by a group of armed white men.'0 06 5 In
the disturbance that followed, one of the whites was killed.1
Shortly after the African-American petitioners were arrested
on murder charges, a white mob marched on the jail bent on seizing the petitioners and lynching them.10 7 The mob was thwarted
by federal troops and turned away only after being promised that
those found guilty would be executed.1 08 The petitioners were ultimately brought to trial in what can only charitably be called a sham
proceeding. 0 9 Blacks were systematically excluded from the grand
and petit juries, and the court-appointed defense counsel had
never consulted with the defendants before trial. 10 Furthermore,
the defense counsel neither sought a change of venue, a basic, almost rudimentary litigation tactic, given the circumstances surrounding the trial, nor did he seek to put on a defense."' None of
the defendants was called to the stand, nor were any defense witnesses called.' 1 2 In all, the so-called trial lasted approximately
three-quarters of an hour and in fewer than five minutes the jury
113
returned a guilty verdict on the first-degree murder charges.
Dismissing petitioners' claims of mob domination, the Arkansas Supreme Court summarily upheld the convictions. 1 4 The defendants subsequently petitioned for federal habeas relief on the
ground that "the proceedings in the State Court, although trial in
form, were only a form, and that the [defendants] were hurried to
conviction under the pressure of a mob without any regard for
their rights and without according them due process of law."" 5
Although the district court dismissed the petition, the Supreme
104
105
106
107

108
109
110

111
112

11
114
115

Moore, 261 U.S. at 90-92.
Id. at 87.
Id.
Id. at 88.
Id. at 88-89.
See id.
Id. at 89.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 91.
Id. at 87.
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Court reversed, holding that in the absence of state corrective
processes, federal habeas was an appropriate vehicle in which to
review claims that a state trial was mob dominated. 116
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, writing for the Court, stated
that:
In Frank v. Magnum.. . it was recognized of course that if in fact
a trial is dominated by a mob.., and... "if the State, supplying
no corrective process, carries into execution ajudgment ...pro-

duced by mob domination, the State deprives the accused of his
life or liberty without due process of law." We assume in accordance with that case that the corrective process supplied by the
State may be so adequate that interference by habeas corpus
ought not to be allowed. It certainly is true that mere mistakes of
law ...are not to be corrected in that way. But if the case is that

the whole proceeding is a mask-that counsel, jury and judge
were swept to the fatal end by an irresistible wave of public passion, and that the State Courts failed to correct the wrong,
neither perfection in the machinery for correction nor the possibility that the trial court and counsel saw no other way of avoiding an immediate outbreak of the mob can prevent this Court
17
from securing to the petitioners their constitutional rights.'
If ever a case cried out for justice, it was Moore v. Dempsey. In Moore,
unlike Frank v. Magnum, the state supreme court made no inquiry
into the petitioners' claim of mob domination, nor did it make any
specific findings on the record. On these facts, it is not unsurprising that the Supreme Court felt compelled to issue the writ. From
the majority's standpoint, a failure to issue the writ would have
meant that the Court was turning its back on justice.
As for the state's corrective practices, Justice Holmes
commented:
We shall not say more concerning the corrective process afforded to the petitioners than that it does not seem to us sufficient to allow a Judge of the United States to escape the duty of
examining the facts for himself when if true as alleged they
make the trial absolutely void.1 1 "
Despite the fact that the Supreme Court couched its decision in
terms of a "jurisdictional defect," it is clear that what the Court was
searching for was a means of reviewing claims that could not be
brought before the Court by any other means. The Court, in effect, was saying to petitioners that if they could not get a legitimate
116 Id.
117 Id. at
118 Id. at

90-91.
92.
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claim addressed on direct appeal, they could use habeas corpus as
an alternate means of ensuring judicial review.
Although the Supreme Court in Moore paid lipservice to the
notion that habeas was a vehicle for reviewing jurisdictional error,
the Moore decision opened the door to more searching judicial
scrutiny. After Moore, federal courts assumed the role of judicial
process enforcers, guaranteeing that state courts afforded defendants adequate judicial process.
In Ex parte Hawk," 9 the Court honed its new habeas policy,
explaining that "[w] here the state courts have considered and adjudicated the merits of [a petitioner's] contentions . . . a federal
court will not ordinarily reexamine upon writ of habeas corpus the
questions thus adjudicated."1 2 0 So far so good. The Court is simply repeating what was the generally recognized scope of habeas
review at the time.
However, the Court went on to say:
[b]ut where resort to state court remedies has failed to afford
full and fair adjudication of the federal contentions raised,
either because the state affords no remedy.., or because in the
particular case the remedy afforded by state law proves in practice unavailable or seriously inadequate . . . a federal court

should entertain [the petitioner's]
petition for habeas corpus,
12 1
else he would be remediless.
This statement is perhaps the best illustration of the "hard cases
make bad law" maxim.
Faced with patently unjust circumstances, the Supreme Court
reached for a remedy that would permit just results in an individual case. By so doing, however, the Court turned habeas jurisprudence on its head. The Court failed to articulate what it intended
by "full and fair adjudication of the federal contentions raised."
Does that mean the state court permitted the claim to be raised, or
that the state court decided the claim to the Supreme Court's satisfaction? Obviously, the phrase is loaded with ambiguity.
The phrase that "the remedy afforded by the state proves in
practice unavailable or seriously inadequate" is similarly difficult to
decipher. An "unavailable" remedy is one thing, an "inadequate"
remedy, however, is a different creature altogether. Any remedy
the state believes is suitably adequate for the alleged breach may be
deemed inadequate by the Supreme Court. If anything, the Court
119 321
120

U.S. 114 (1944).

Id. at 118.

121 Id.
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was faced with an "I know it when I see it" type problem. Although
Moore v. Dempsey was apparently an obscene miscarriage of justice,
cases of that sort are (hopefully) the exception, not the rule. Congressional inaction and judicial intervention transformed the writ
from a fairly narrow procedural remedy to an all-encompassing
panacea.
c.

The Writ Distended: Habeas Corpus as a Substitute for
Appellate Review

Frustrated, at least in part, by its inability to correct certain
errors on appeal (or through certiorari), the Supreme Court
adapted habeas to meet its needs. In Brown v. Allen,12 2 Townsend v.
Sain, 2 and Fay v. Noia,1 24 the Court not only transformed the purpose of the habeas writ, but determined that habeas corpus review
was not subject to the same constraints applicable to direct review
in the courts of appeals.
This transformation of the writ, coupled with the expansion of
substantive federal constitutional rights, enabled inferior federal
courts to review the decision of state appellate tribunals. The constitutionalization of many aspects of criminal procedure-from the
Confrontation Clause to the right to counsel and jury selectionturned virtually every significant state trial court decision into a
question of federal constitutional significance. Perversely, even if a
state supreme court-every bit as beholden to the Constitution as
the United States Supreme Court-determined that (for example)
the Confrontation Clause was satisfied by the way in which a crossexamination was conducted, a lone federal district court could
overrule a state supreme court, and the entire state criminal justice
system, on a question of federal law.
1)

Brown v. Allen and the Rejection of Comity

In Brown v. Allen, the petitioner was convicted of rape in a
North Carolina court and sentenced to death. 12 5 Brown appealed
to the North Carolina Supreme Court, asserting that his federal
constitutional rights were violated by the introduction of an allegedly coerced confession at trial and by racial discrimination in the
selection of the grand and petitjuries. 1 6 Each of these claims had
122
123
124
125
126

344 U.S. 443 (1953).
372 U.S. 293 (1963).
372 U.S. 391 (1963).
Brown, 344 U.S. at 466.
Id.
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been litigated in the trial court and rejected.12 7 The North Carolina Supreme Court similarly rejected Brown's2 8claims, and the
United States Supreme Court denied certiorari.1
Brown then petitioned for habeas relief in federal court."
The district court dismissed Brown's petition without a hearing.'
The court of appeals affirmed the denial of the writ.'5 '

The

Supreme Court subsequently granted certiorari, holding that
Brown was entitled to a full review of his constitutional claims in
the district court on his habeas petition.13 2 Although Brown's constitutional claims had been fully (if not fairly) litigated in the state
courts, the Supreme Court ruled that federal district courts must,
even in collateral proceedings, review fully the merits of federal
constitutional claims.133 Justice Felix Frankfurter, in one of two
opinions for the Court, 3 4 reasoned: "The State Court cannot have
the last say when it, though on fair consideration and what procedurally may be deemed fairness, may have misconceived a federal
constitutional right. " 13 5 The concurring Justice did not stop there,
but rather made explicit the hitherto implicit direction taken by
the Court. Justice Frankfurter explained that "State adjudication
of questions of law cannot, under the habeas corpus statute, be
accepted as binding."3 6 The Justice asserted that "[i] t is precisely
3
these questions that the federal judge is commanded to decide." 1
Unfortunately, Justice Frankfurter never quite explained what
part of the habeas statute "commanded" federal judges to substitute state court determinations on legal questions with their own,
independent judgments. The 1867 Habeas Act certainly does not
empower federal judges to ignore the substantive legal determinations of their state counterparts, nor can such an admonition be
gleaned from an examination of the Act's legislative history.
The difficulty with Justice Frankfurter's claim, at least in part,
is that the state court is not the final arbiter of the federal rightId.
Id. at 467.
12 Id. at 452.
130 Id.
131 Id.
132 Id.
133 Id.
134 Justice Reed authored the Court's formal opinion; however, Justice Frankfurter
wrote a concurring opinion and was joined in part by four other Justices on the question of the effect in a habeas proceeding of a prior denial of certiorari by the
Supreme Court. See id. at 451-52.
'35 Id. at 508 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
136 Id. at 506 (Frankfurter, J., concurring).
'37 Id.
127
128
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the United States Supreme Court is. State courts, moreover, are no
less bound to follow federal law than federal courts are. Article VI
expressly provides that "[t]his Constitution, and the Laws of the
United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof ...

shall

be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State
shall be bound thereby.

. .

."I"

Professor Bator has noted that:

"[o]f course federal law is higher than state law. But this does not
automatically tell us that it is better for federal judges to pronounce it than state judges.""3 9 I would go one step further and
suggest that a panel of judges (such as a State Supreme Court) is
more likely to get the federal question right than a single district
court judge.
Under Frank v. Magnum, where a state furnished an adequate
(whatever that means) corrective process, federal habeas relief was
unavailable. 140 In the wake of Brown v. Allen, however, regardless of
whether a state court had fully and fairly (whatever that means)
litigated them, any constitutional claim could be relitigated on federal habeas corpus. The Supreme Court abandoned any desire to
preserve traditional rules of comity or to limit itself to scrutinizing
state corrective procedures. Instead, the Court sought to resolve
any underlying constitutional errors without relying upon the state
141
courts' ability to get the answer "right."
2)

Townsend v. Sain and the Opening of the FactualRecord

Although Townsend v. Sain can be read as limiting a federal
court's review of a state court's determination, the case actually expanded the federal courts' authority. The Supreme Court held
that a new evidentiary hearing would have to be held whenever:
(1) the merits of the factual dispute were not resolved in the
state hearing; (2) the state factual determination is not fairly
supported by the record as a whole; (3) the fact-finding proce138 U.S. CONST., art. VI.
139 Bator, supra note 56, at 505.
140 See Frank, 237 U.S. at 335-36.
141 Brown v. Allen is particularly interesting

as it was decided the same year as Brown
v. Board ofEducation L The Supreme Court was thus highly sensitized to the injustices
visited upon African-Americans in the state courts. The Court may well have believed
that comity, while a nice idea in principle, no longer deserved serious consideration.
State courts, the Supreme Court seemed to be saying, could not be counted on the
protect the federal constitutional rights of all Americans, and thus were inferior dis-

pensers ofjustice. And the high court was not about to let procedural niceties stand
in the way ofjustice, at least justice as envisioned by the Court. While one may quibble with the procedural means by which the Court "found" a remedy, it is difficult to
disagree with the Court's ultimate goal.
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dure employed by the state court was not adequate to afford a
full and fair hearing; (4) there is a substantial allegation of
newly discovered evidence; (5) the material facts were not adequately developed at the state-court hearing; or (6) for any reason it appears that the state trier of fact did
not afford the
14 2
habeas applicant a full and fair fact hearing.
Although couched as a limitation on federal courts' authority to
issue habeas in state cases, the decision actually stands as an onslaught on state judicial power. As a result of Townsend, federal
courts were authorized both to conduct evidentiary hearings and
consider whether the state factual determination was "fairly supported by the record as a whole."q' Federal courts were also empowered to scrutinize state judicial proceedings to determine
whether they afforded petitioner a "full and fair hearing. " 144
To some extent, the breadth of the Supreme Court's decision
leads one to wonder whether it was worth the state court's time to
even conduct an evidentiary hearing. The Court did not stop on
opening the state courts' factual determinations to judicial scrutiny, however. The Court also declared that the district court could
not defer to the state courts' legal determinations on federal questions and must instead independently apply federal law to the facts.
While this decision to prevent a state court from being the final
arbiter on questions of federal law follows naturally from the
Court's earlier habeas jurisprudence, the opening of the factual
record represented a significant step in transforming habeas review
into a type of direct appellate review unencumbered by many of
the standards governing that review.
3)

Providing a Federal Remedy: Fay v. Noia

In Fay v. Noia, the Supreme Court held the exhaustion doctrine inapplicable to remedies no longer available to the petitioner."4 In other words, a procedural default that might bar
review of a claim on direct review would not prohibit review of the
claim on a habeas petition. Noia was convicted of a murder in
1942 on the basis of a signed confession. 14 6 Although Noia's codefendants had been released because the Court ruled that their confessions had been coerced, Noia did not appeal his sentence in
1942 because to have done so would have placed him at risk for a
142

Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 313 (1963).

143
144

Id.
Id.

145

Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 398-99 (1963).
at 394-95.

146 Id.
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death sentence on retrial rather a sentence of life imprisonment.'4 7
Although the parties stipulated that Noia's confession had
been coerced, the federal district court refused to grant habeas relief.'4 ' The court observed that Noia's failure to appeal his conviction-a remedy no longer available to him-made him ineligible
for habeas relief because the exhaustion rule had not been satisfied. 14 9 As a result of the district court's ruling, Noia was essentially
left without a remedy. He could not appeal, because the time in
which to appeal had expired. Yet he could not file a habeas petition, because he had not previously appealed.
The court of appeals reversed, questioning whether Noia's failure to appeal would now bar him from filing a habeas petition. 5 °
The Supreme Court agreed, holding that the exhaustion requirement "refers only to a failure to exhaust state remedies still open to
the applicant at the time he fies his application for habeas corpus
in the federal court."151 The Court nevertheless left to the district
court's discretion whether it would deny relief to a petitioner who
had "deliberately by-passed the orderly procedures of the state
courts."' 52
Although Noia had made a rational decision not to appeal,
"[h]is was the grisly choice whether to sit content with life imprisonment or to travel the uncertain avenue of appeal which, if successful, might well have led to retrial and death sentence." 15 The
"choice" not to exhaust remedies, the Supreme Court seems to be
saying, must be for purposes of circumventing the state's corrective
procedures. Even a deliberate decision to forgo exhaustion of state
remedies would not constitute failure to exhaust as long as the petitioner had been faced with a "grisly choice." Essentially, the
Supreme Court completed the habeas writ's transformation from a
limited procedural remedy to a broad general writ of error.
d. FederalizingCriminal Law
Justice Robert Jackson, in his separate opinion in Brown v. Allen, bitterly complained that judicial tinkering with habeas corpus
jurisdiction resulted in "floods of stale, frivolous, and repetitious
147

Id. at 395.

148 Id. at

395-96.

Id. at 396.
Id. at 396-97.
Id. at 399. At the same time, the Supreme Court overruled Darr v. Burford, 339
U.S. 200 (1950).
152 Fay, 372 U.S. at 438.
153 Id. at 440.
149
150
151

1996]

FEDERAL WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS

1527

petitions [that] inundate the docket of the lower courts and swell
our own." 15 4 The "flood" of petitions Justice Jackson referred to
consisted of 541 petitions filed in 1952, the preceding year. In
comparison, state prisoners filed approximately 11,836 federal
habeas petitions in 1994 (the most recent year for which data is
available).55 Combined with the 1,466 habeas petitions filed by
federal prisoners, the district courts were besieged with a total of
13,302 federal habeas petitions in 1994. Although the vast majority of these petitions do not result in the release or retrial of the
petitioner, they undermine confidence in the criminal justice system, waste precious judicial resources, and, as a result, may diminish the amount of time spent reviewing potentially meritorious
claims.
The flood of habeas petitions can largely be traced to two
sources: First, the Supreme Court's steady widening of habeas
corpus review (restricted only in fairly recent times) and second,
the expansion of federally protected constitutional rights. I have
already detailed the Supreme Court's transformation of the Great
Writ into a general writ of error. With respect to the second issue,
the expansion of substantive rights, little needs to be said.
As Judge Friendly has explained, the constitutionalization of
virtually every aspect of criminal procedure has made it possible to
cast any trial irregularity or procedural error as a constitutional
claim. "Any claimed violation of the hearsay rule is now regularly

presented not as a mere trial error but as an infringement of the
sixth amendment right to confrontation."1 5 6 He added that
Denial of adequate opportunity for impeachment would seem as
much a violation of the confrontation clause as other restrictions on cross-examination have been held to be. Refusal to give
the name and address of an informer can be cast as a denial of
the sixth amendment's guarantee of "compulsory process for
obtaining witnesses." Inflammatory summations or an erroneburden of proof become denious charge on the 1 prosecution's
57
als of due process.

Today, few criminal procedure issues are beyond the Constitution's
reach. As Judge Friendly observed, "[t]oday, it is the rare criminal
appeal that does not involve a constitutional claim." 5 8 A quarter
154 Brown, 344 U.S. at 536 (Jackson, J., concurring).
155 ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS, ANNUAL REPORTS OF THE DIRECTOR
OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE U.S. COURTS

156 Friendly, supra note 1, at 155.
157 Id. at 155-56.
158 Id. at 156.

(1994).
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century later, this statement still rings true.
As a consequence of this expansion of federal rights, Judge
Friendly recognized that "the limitation of collateral attack to 'constitutional' grounds has become almost meaningless."15 9 And so it
has. The Supreme Court has made some effort to restrict the
reach of habeas review by recognizing that only significant constitutional errors, those that do not constitute harmless error, are judicially cognizable. Use of the harmless error standard to assess
constitutional claims, however, has come under repeated attacks.
The Constitution has been violated, the argument goes, so how can
such a violation possibly be considered a harmless error? Yet, to
anyone who has ever tried a criminal case, it is clear that if every
alleged trial error was subject to collateral attack and challenge
without a harmless error standard, a good many cases would be
overturned on appeal and greater (not fewer) injustices would
occur.
III.

CONGRESS AND HABEAS CoRPus REFORM

If the Supreme Court has faced criticism for allegedly eroding
the scope of federal habeas review, so has Congress come under
attack for attempting to revise it. The first question one must ask
is: why bother to reform the writ? This question is not easy to answer, because it depends upon one's perspective.
Reform is necessary for a number of reason, not the least of
which is to preserve the integrity of the writ itself. Concern for the
efficient administration ofjustice tells us that federal courts cannot
adequately handle the enormous number of petitions that are
filed-many of which are stale or frivolous and contribute nothing
to the just resolution of cases. Federal courts are burdened to the
point that they may be impaired in allocating the time necessary to
review legitimate claims. 6 ' If the number of filings are weighed
against the number of petitions granted, habeas review results in
little incremental justice. The habeas corpus review process is a
redundant litigious process that imposes significant costs on the
criminal justice system.
159 Id. at 157.
160 In 1940, state prisoners filed a total of 89 habeas corpus petitions. That figure
grew to 560 petitions filed in 1950. After the federalization of criminal procedure
that occurred in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the number of state habeas corpus
petitions jumped to 872 in 1960, and experienced over a five-fold increase by 1965,
resulting in 4,845 petitions. Since 1970, when 9,088 petitions were filed, to 1995,
when 13,632 petitions were filed, the number of habeas petitions filed each year has
fluctuated, with a gradual upward drift.
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The resource question, however, is only one side of the equation. There is also the question of whether federal courts should
be permitted essentially to relitigate cases already decided in a state
tribunal. Dual sovereignty and principles of comity demand that
state courts are accorded respect. While Professors Cover and
Aleinkoff have argued that multi-level review of federal claims cre161 I
ates a constructive dialogue between state and federal courts,
would claim (with just as little empirical evidence) that the current
state of federal habeas review may be destructive. A dialogue can
generally exist only between coequal partners. The current structure of habeas reform, however, subordinates the entire state judicial system to a lone federal judge. It is thus less a dialogue than a
monologue: state values (and voices) do not count for much.
At times it appears as though federal courts are the only game
in town, and that state courts are merely an afterthought. The reality, however, is that state courts handle by far the larger criminal
law docket and, by and large, render decisions that are upheld
even under the closest scrutiny of the federal courts.
Another significant problem is whether the habeas writ,
designed for enabling a court to enquire into the legality of a pretrial detainment or a trial court's jurisdiction, is the appropriate
vehicle for conducting a broad-based review of a trial verdict. Federal courts, in an attempt to provide remedies in situations demanding relief, have pulled and twisted the Great Writ into an
uncomfortable shape. The Senate reform proposal, discussed below, is an attempt to return balance to the writ and to provide a
federal forum only in those instances where such a forum is most
needed, and most likely to do justice.
A.

Legislative Proposals in the 104th Congress

Congress has long sought to reform the habeas corpus process. 162 In 1995, the United States Senate considered two reform
proposals that could have a dramatic impact on future habeas practice. One proposal, introduced by SenatorJon Kyl of Arizona, was
rejected.'6 3 Its rejection is interesting as a measure of how the Senate approaches habeas reform. The other proposal, sponsored by
Senator Orrin Hatch of Utah, passed the Senate as part of an Anti161 See generally Robert M. Cover & T. Alexander Aleinikoff, DialecticalFederalism:
Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 Yale L.J. 1035 (1977).
162 See generally Orrin Hatch, The Importanceof HabeasCorpus Reform, 14 CRiM. Just.J.
149 (1992).
163 See CONG. REc., S7829 (daily ed. June 7, 1995).
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Terrorism Bill. That bill, currently under consideration by the
House of Representatives, stands a good chance of becoming law.
1.

Two Paths to Reform

In the aftermath of an apparent terrorist attack on a federal
building in Oklahoma City, Oklahoma, the Clinton Administration
submitted legislation to Congress to address the threat of domestic
and international terrorism.
Senate Republicans seized this opportunity to amend the bill
to include a provision reforming the federal habeas corpus process. The proposal, drafted by Senators On-in Hatch of Utah and
Arlen Specter of Pennsylvania, was ultimately included in the bill
the Senate passed. Senator Jon Kyl of Arizona, however, introduced a competing proposal that was narrowly rejected.'" That
proposal virtually eliminated federal habeas review for state cases.
a.

Abolition of FederalHabeas Corpus for State Prisoners: A
ProposalRejected

Despite claims to the contrary, there is little support for the
idea that the Constitution protects from suspension the broad,
post-conviction collateral relief that exists today. Congress, by statute, could thus greatly modify the scope of habeas review. Perhaps
the easiest, cleanest means of reforming habeas corpus would be to
return it to a limited review of pretrial incarceration or specific
jurisdictional defects. It is unlikely, however, given the general
tenor of the contemporary debate, whether a return to such a limited review would ever be possible (or even desirable).
A competing proposal would simply abolish the federal writ
for state prisoners, unless the state provided no means of reviewing
an illegal incarceration. That is precisely the proposal Senator Kyl
advanced in the 104th Congress. Senator Kyl's legislation, proposed as an amendment to the Anti-Terrorism Bill, provided:
Notwithstanding any other provision of law, an application for a
writ of habeas corpus in behalf of a person in custody pursuant
to a judgment or order of a State court shall not be entertained
by a court of the United States unless the remedies in the courts
of the State are inadequate
or ineffective to test the legality of
165
the person's detention.
This legislation would effectively preclude federal habeas review in
See id,
165 Id.
164
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all but the most egregious cases or instances in which the state judicial system afforded no relief.
As has been demonstrated, federal habeas has been generally
available to state prisoners for only approximately the last forty
years. Prior to that, the federal remedy was either fairly limited in
scope, or simply unavailable to state prisoners at all. The Kyl reform would neither impair the type of habeas review contemplated
in the Constitution, nor would it prevent state courts from affording a much broader scope of review. The state prisoner could still
seek review by the Supreme Court after exhausting his direct appeals, and the Court could act to ensure the supremacy of federal
law. Senator Kyl, in floor debate, made precisely this point, noting
that "it should go without saying that there is always review in the
U.S. Supreme Court from any decision of the highest court of a
State." So there is ultimately still the potential for federal review of
166
a state court decision.
As Senator Kyl observed, Congress adopted a similar remedy
in the District of Columbia. In establishing an independent judicial system for the District, Congress barred District prisoners from
petitioning for federal habeas relief. Instead, Congress forced District prisoners to seek collateral relief in the newly created District
of Columbia courts. 6 7 As Judge Carl McGowan has recounted,
there has been no discernible adverse effect on the quality of the
District proceedings or the adequacy of the available remedies. 6 8
The Kyl proposal, like the reform adopted in the District of Columbia, was not constitutionally suspect. As an example of how far
from the writ's original moorings the debate has drifted, however,
the Kyl amendment was handily defeated.
b.

ProceduralLimitations and Deference to State Adjudication:
The Senate Adopts More Limited Habeas Reform

The reform proposal ultimately adopted by the Senate was
that advanced by Senator Orrin Hatch. Although a fairly complicated piece of legislation, the bill contains three important reId.
The Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of this action in Swain v. Pressley, 430 U.S. 372 (1977). In Swain, the Court rejected the petitioner's claim that D.C.
judges (like most state court judges) lacked life tenure and were not, therefore, sufficiently independent to review habeas petitions fairly. Id. at 381-383. To date, no decision has found that the local remedy is either an inadequate or ineffective test of the
legality of detention, the statutory qualification for obtaining federal habeas relief.
168 Carl McGowan, The Viewfrom an Inferior Court, 19 SAN DoEGo L. REv. 659, 667-69
(1982).
166
167
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forms. First, it sets limits on the time in which a prisoner can
petition for federal habeas relief. Second, the reform proposal
substantially revises the standard of deference given to state court
adjudications. And finally, the bill imposes stringent limits on second and successive habeas petitions. Although a number of other
procedural changes were made by the legislation, including a requirement that counsel be appointed for indigent petitioners in
both state and federal habeas proceedings, these three changes
form the bill's core.
1)

Time Limits

One of the most intractable problems associated with federal
habeas corpus is that no time limits apply. This makes perfect
sense if one considers the historical purposes of the writ. Unlawful
pretrial restraint would end with commencement of trial. Jurisdictional defects, which required no evidentiary hearing or reliance
on witness testimony, involved legal judgments that are not particularly time sensitive. Unfortunately, with the expansion of habeas
review came the need for evidentiary hearings, affidavits, and the
like; while the writ expanded, however, no time limits were
adopted. Prisoners can thus file habeas petitions at virtually any
time. Justice Powell, who had chaired the so-called "Powell Commission," which searched for ways to reform federal habeas practice, observed:
Another cause of overload of the federal system is [28 U.S.C.]
§ 2254, conferring federal habeas corpus jurisdiction to review
state court criminal convictions. There is no statute of limitations, and no finality of federal review of state convictions.
Thus, repetitive recourse is commonplace. I know of no other
system of justice structured in a way that assures no end to the
litigation of a criminal conviction. Our practice in this respect is
viewed with disbelief by lawyers and judges in other countries.
1 69
Nor does the Constitution require this sort of redundancy.
To this end, the reform proposal adopted by the Senate establishes a six-month statute of limitations for filing a federal habeas
corpus petition in capital cases-provided that counsel is made
available for indigent prisoners in state post-conviction collateral
proceedings. Similarly, in non-capital cases, a one-year statute of
limitations applies. The limitation runs from either:
(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclu169 Lewis Powell, Address Before the American Bar Association Division of Judicial
Administration (Aug. 9, 1982).
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sion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking
such review;
(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application
created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of
the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented
from filing by such State action;
(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been
newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively
applicable to cases on collateral review; or
(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or
have been discovered through the exerclaims presented could
1 70
cise of due diligence.
Although the limitation period would normally be expected to run
from the exhaustion of state remedies, the time would be tolled if a
prisoner were illegally prevented from filing a petition, or if the
Supreme Court recognized, and retroactively applied, a "new" constitutional right.
The legislation would bring an end to the interminable continuation of litigation that runs rampant in the current habeas process. The time limitation nevertheless recognizes that a petitioner
may be illegally prevented from filing, or that circumstances may
arise where she can take advantage of a constitutional right hitherto unrecognized. In those circumstances, the time limitation is
deferred.
This is far more generous than even direct appeal in the federal system. While the individual states differ, ordinarily a federal
defendant must decide within ten days of conviction whether to
appeal. A state defendant pursuing a writ of certiorari from the
Supreme Court must apply within sixty days of the affirmance of
her conviction by that state's highest tribunal. A federal defendant
who seeks a new trial on the grounds of newly discovered evidence
must apply within two years of the final judgment's entry.
Interestingly, a federal defendant who finds proof of innocence three years after final judgment must rely upon a grant of
executive clemency, while a prisoner who asserts constitutional violations, which may have no bearing upon his guilt, is permitted to
file for relief at any time.' 7 1 This reform measure would bring
170 S. 623, 104th Cong., lst Sess. § 2 (1995). Congress subsequently passed, and the
President signed into law, this sweeping habeas reform proposal as part of the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.
171 While it is true that a prisoner who belatedly discovers evidence affecting her
trial may file a habeas petition on the basis of that evidence, and some courts (depending on the nature of the evidence) may choose to entertain the petition, the
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habeas in line with other appellate procedures and go far towards
resolving the problem of undermining finality.
2)

Comity and the Standard of Deference Due State Court
Adjudications

The most significant aspect of the bill is the way in which it
limits the scope of federal review of a state court's determination of
federal law. Under the current system, state court fact-finding is
presumed to be correct if certain conditions set forth in 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d) are satisfied, but is subject to rebuttal by convincing evidence. 7 2 The federal court, however, is required to make an independent determination of questions of federal law, and then to
apply the law to the facts without deference to the state court
resolution.
Even if a state trial court has made a legal determination that
has been upheld by an appellate court and affirmed by the state's
highest tribunal, a lone federal district court judge can blithely ignore those determinations and sweep the hearth clean. It does not
matter if the decision is close, or turns on unsettled legal questions
on which the federal courts themselves may disagree. Since the
standard of review for factual questions differs from that of reviewing mixed questions of fact and law, the district court must also
make a judgment as to whether the question is purely factual or
mixed.
The bill resolves this issue by returning to the traditional standard of comity afforded to state courts. Recognizing that state
courts are as beholden to the Constitution and federal law as are
federal courts, the bill permits a federal court to overturn a state
court's federal law determination only if it is "contrary to clearly
established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court," or if
it involves an "unreasonable application" of clearly established federal law to the facts, or if the State court's factual determination is
itself "unreasonable." 73
preferred avenue is through Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b). See FED. R Crv. P.
60(b).
172 See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
173 The legislation provides, in relevant part that:
An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in
custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted
... unless the adjudication of the claim(1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved and unreasonable application of, dearly established federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court; or
(2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable deter-
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A determination by a state court that was reasonable in its disposition of legal and factual issues would thus command deference
provided it was reached by procedures comporting with due process. If habeas corpus exists (at least in today's world) to correct
fundamental defects in the law, then why should a federal court be
able to overturn a reasonable determination by a state court? If a
state court has reasonably applied federal law, it is hard to argue
that a fundamental defect exists. Opponents of reform argue that
it ends habeas review altogether and permits state courts to rely on
incorrect interpretations of federal law. In reality, the habeas
corpus reform procedures adopted by the Senate require the federal courts to defer to their state counterparts, while at the same
time preserving the federal courts' ability to overturn state court
decisions that clearly contradict federal law, as determined by the
Supreme Court. This standard essentially grants a federal court
the authority to review de novo whether the state court decided the
claim in contravention of federal law. Federal habeas review exists
to correct fundamental defects in the law. If a state court has reasonably applied federal law, the claim that a fundamental defect
exists becomes somewhat tenuous.
Ultimately, any state court decision will be subject to review by
the United States Supreme Court. If the Supreme Court decides
that a state court's interpretation of federal law is incorrect, it can
always overrule the state court. The Supreme Court is the proper
forum in which to resolve a conflict among state supreme courts,
much the way the Court resolves differences among the various
federal courts of appeals.
3)

Limits on Second or Successive Petitions

The third significant aspect of the Senate habeas reform legislation is its limitation on second or successive habeas petitions.
The Supreme Court has placed certain limits on repetitive petitions, but those limitations are fairly narrow. In reality, a prisoner
can continue to file meritless petitions with relative impunity.
The reform legislation, however, would restrict the filing of
repetitive petitions by requiring that any second or successive petition be approved for filing in the district court by a panel of the
court of appeals. Requiring a circuit court to screen petitions
would have the effect of precluding a single district court judge
mination of the facts in light of evidence presented in the States
court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
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from "sitting" on a petition. Significantly, the circuit court would
permit a petition to go forward if it satisfied one of two narrow
grounds: first, if it raises a claim based on a new rule of constitutional law that is retroactively applicable; or second, if it is based on
newly discovered evidence that could not have been discovered
through due diligence in time to present the claim in the first petition and that, if proven, would show by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable finder of fact would have found the
applicant guilty of the charged offense.
The first criteria is essentially a statutory bow to Teague v.
Lane, 74 in which the Court chose to exclude from habeas review
claims based on rules announced after the date of exhaustion in
state court. The so-called new rules, the Court declared, could not
be created on collateral review. Teague was, at least in part, a prudential decision. The Court was faced with the question of how far
back a new decision should undo the work of judges, lawyers, and
juries, who had obeyed the rules in place at the time the initial
decisions were rendered. Teague has been criticized on the
grounds that it permits a decision to stand based on a flawed reading of the Constitution or federal law. Under the Teague rule, the
Supreme Court would be implicitly sanctioning an unconstitutional decision.
The practical problem the Court faced, however, is that because so many new constitutional rules have been created, a rule
permitting automatic retroactive application of those rules could
seriously destabilize the state and federal criminal justice systems.
The law prefers stability, creation of constitutional directives out of
whole cloth that affect cases previously decided does not lead to
that stability.
Often overlooked in the criticisms made of Teague is that the
decision preserves the courts' authority to correct injustice. New
rules (even those created on collateral review) will be given retroactive effect if defendants are convicted under fundamentally unfair procedures raising grave doubt as to the reliability of the guilty
verdict, and cases in which defendants are convicted for engaging
in constitutionally protected conduct. The Senate bill codifies the
Teague rule and provides the Court leeway to adopt additional rules
and apply these rules retroactively.
The second condition under which successive petitions may be
174 489 U.S. 288 (1989). Although a plurality opinion, a majority of the Court subsequently accepted the Teague rule. See Penry v. Lynaugh, 492 U.S. 302, 313 (1989).
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reviewed is basically a codification of McClesky v. Zant.'75 In McClesky, the Supreme Court held that a second round of federal review is precluded unless the defendant shows either actual
innocence or "cause and prejudice."176 While the actual innocence standard is fairly self-explanatory, the cause and prejudice
rule is a trifle more complicated. At one time a defendant could
show "cause" for not having raised an issue earlier because the
Supreme Court had unexpectedly created a new rule that the defendant could not have anticipated. 1 77 "Prejudice" required a showing that the outcome of the case could have been affected by the
change in circumstances. While the "cause and prejudice" standard has been altered by intervening decisions, 17 1 the "actual innocence" standard remains important.
The convicted person's actual innocence is by far the most
compelling ground for habeas review. Professor Bator's seminal
article, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State
Prisoners,is devoted to demonstrating that relitigating claims, even
constitutional claims, on federal habeas corpus review is unjustified. 179 He concludes by recommending that federal courts consider actual guilt or innocence as the determinative factor in
deciding whether to grant habeas relief.'
Judge Friendly made a
similar proposal, proffering that "with limited exceptions, an applicant for habeas corpus must make a colorable showing of inno18 1
cence" before habeas relief should be granted.
What Professor Bator and Judge Friendly recognized, and
what McClesky ultimately embraced, is the notion that innocence is
always relevant. If federal habeas corpus is a tool to correct injustice, then surely it must be available for claims of actual innocence.
The Senate legislation ensures the continuation of this important
habeas function. If a petitioner can produce evidence that was previously unknown or unavailable to him, and this evidence is suffi175 499 U.S. 467 (1991).
176 Id. at 493.
177 See Reed v. Ross, 468 U.S. 1, 16 (1984).

178 The Teague rule, however, with its abolishment of the retroactive application of
most new rules, has basically eliminated this form of cause. The most common variant of "cause" today is in the discovery of new facts that could not have previously
been discovered with reasonable diligence. This generally applies to situations such
as the development of new scientific tools not previously available, such as DNA identifiers, or situations in which law enforcement officers failed to disclose, or illegally
suppressed, facts known to them.
179 See generally Bator, supra note 56.
180 See id.

181 See Friendly, supra note 1 at 150.
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ciently important to undermine the reliability of the jury's verdict,
then a successive petition will be available to him. The exception
permits petitioners to avail themselves of new scientific tools, such
as DNA identification which may definitively establish innocence,
or to protect themselves from law enforcement officers who may
have suppressed material or exculpatory evidence. In this vein, the
Senate proposal ensures that the writ of habeas corpus will continue to guard against incarceration of a defendant who is in fact
innocent of the charged crime.
4)

Critics of Reform

Reform is never without its critics, particularly when dealing
with an issue as fraught with emotion as habeas corpus litigation.
Unfortunately, and albeit inevitably, much of the habeas debate
has been waged on the capital punishment battlefield, or in the
context of the deeper, systemic problem of race (or racism) in the
criminal justice system. As the historical evidence shows, federal
habeas was expanded largely to afford protection to African-Americans, who, having won legal recognition and citizen status, were
then faced with certain state criminal justice systems that denied
them their hard-won liberties. While a case can be made that federal district courts did not accord African-Americans much more
respect than their state court counterparts, African-Americans ultimately did fare better in federal court.
It is thus difficult to propose reform to a remedy that, as least
for some, stands as a beacon for certain principles. Tinkering with
the remedy, rather than being viewed as an arcane legal endeavor,
can thus become an assault on a particular set of moral beliefs or
ideals. Habeas corpus, as a legal remedy, may have needed dramatic expansion in order to provide relief to those whose rights
had been violated. Faced with severe limitations on direct review,
and few other tools by which to correct manifest injustice, federal
courts chose collateral attack as the preferred means to provide a
remedy for otherwise irreparable injustices.
The question remains, however, whether a broad habeas remedy is still warranted today, or whether a better procedural device
might be employed. Whether the way in which habeas review has
expanded results in greater justice and more correct verdicts, or
whether it merely serves to undermine confidence in the criminal
justice system, remains unanswered. Unfortunately, change comes
hard. As Judge Friendly observed:
Any murmur of dissatisfaction with this situation (problems with
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the habeas writ) provokes immediate incantation of the Great
Writ, with the inevitable initial capitals, often accompanied by
the suggestion that the objector is the sort of person
who would
1 82
cheerfully desecrate the Ark of the Covenant.

On one side, those satisfied with habeas corpus as an all-encompassing type of appellate review believe that it is necessary to preserve its fundamental function of correcting injustice. Many of
these those critical of efforts to narrow the writ's function are
haunted by the injustices visited on the heads of African-Americans
by state courts. Doubtless, federal courts played a crucial role in
vindicating federal constitutional rights. State courts, it is often
claimed, cannot be expected to render decisions as protective as
those by the federal courts.
Other critics see the writ as a means of frustrating the imposition of capital sentences. By inflating the costs of criminal litigation through filing repetitive habeas petitions, reform opponents
can argue that capital punishment is much more costly than simply
holding someone in prison for life. Capital punishment, unique in
its finality, distorts habeas practice to some degree.
Others adhere to the notion that federal courts should be the
final arbiters of federal law. For various reasons, they flatly reject
the idea that state determinations of federal law should be binding.
Recognizing the land mines involved in proposing reform, I would
like briefly to address what I believe are some of the more significant criticisms in reforming habeas practice.
a)

The ConstitutionalArgument

The single most oft-repeated argument advanced by critics of
habeas reform is that such proposals would interfere with the Great
Writ of the common law, constitutionally protected from suspension except in extreme emergencies. Nicholas deB. Katzenbach,
former Attorney General of the United States, advanced such an
argument in testimony before the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. 183 Mr. Katzenbach, representing the Emergency Committee to
Save Habeas Corpus,1 4 solemnly declared that:
[H]abeas corpus is the means by which we hold government,
182
183

Friendly, supra note 1, at 142.
Hearings on FederalHabeas Corpus Reform Before the United States Senate, Comm. on

the Judiciamy, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (Mar. 28, 1995) (testimony of Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, Emergency Committee to Save Habeas Corpus).
184 The "Emergency Committee to Save Habeas Corpus" evokes images of a Congress bent on abrogating the fundamental rights of Americans and tearing the Constitution asunder.
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State or Federal, responsible, accountable, for due process in
criminal matters. It is the Great Writ, capital "G," capital "W,"
the fundamental underpinning of all our freedoms and perhaps
our greatest heritage. I begin with this reminder because tinkering with something so fundamental requires both legislative wisdom and, if I may, a little legislative humility as well.1 8 5
Unfortunately, arguments of the sort advanced here are simply
misplaced.
The common law writ protected from suspension by the Constitution and the contemporary statutory writ by which federal
courts review state judgments are, in fact, distinct remedies. The
Constitution does not create a habeas writ; rather, the Constitution
protects from suspension a common law remedy that enables prisoners to test the legality of their pretrial detention or, at any time,
to challenge the presiding court's jurisdiction. The Framers
sought to protect the writ from suspension by Congress because
they feared a centralized executive.
The modem habeas writ is a statutory creation that enables
state prisoners to obtain, after exhausting their state remedies, federal review of judicially imposed detention.1 8 6 The habeas corpus
writ of today is thus a very different beast from that of 1789. The
development of the modern writ is in a large part a reaction to a
fear that state courts would not vigorously enforce the Constitution's fundamental protections.
An argument could be made that the Constitution protects
any form of common law writ. The Constitution, after all, does not
define the writ; hence the Framers left it to the courts (and legislatures) to fashion the writ's scope and purposes. The common law,
by definition, emanates from judicial practice and decision. The
contemporary jurisdiction of habeas corpus came about, in large
measure, through judicial expansion of the scope of the writ.
Ergo, it could be asserted that the Constitution now protects a
common law habeas remedy that is substantially different from that
in place at the time the Constitution was ratified.
Proponents of this line of reasoning attempt to take a term
with an intended meaning at one point in time, and then affix to
that term a different meaning and declare for it the same protections. This argument is plainly flawed. It is bootstrapping in the
extreme to identify the contemporary writ with the traditional common law writ and then accord the same protections for that writ.
185
186

See supra note 183.
See 28 U.S.C. § 2254.
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The Right to a FederalForum

A second argument made by those supporting the status quo is
that any person asserting a federal claim enjoys the right to have
that claim adjudicated in federal court. This position is advocated
by those who believe that a right exists to have federal claims adjudicated in a federal forum. The assumption is that federal courts
will be more sensitive to, and diligent in enforcing, federal constitutional rights than their state counterparts. Related to this point
is the notion that state courts lack the Article III protections afforded federal courts and thus fall short of the judicial independence needed to decide claims in accordance with the
Constitution. A variant of this argument, and what may be closer
to the truth, is that state courts are incompetent to adjudicate federal claims.
i.

Only Federal Courts May Declare FederalLaw

Despite lofty claims to the contrary, no one has the right-except in a very narrow class of cases-to have a federal claim adjudicated in federal court. Indeed, the Constitution and historical
practice are plainly at odds with the existence of such a right, and it
is unclear whether such a right is either desirable or practical.
First, the Constitution affords no such right. While the Constitutional Convention was nearly unanimous in supporting the creation of a supreme judicial tribunal, l" 7 the proposal for establishing
inferior federal courts "aroused opposition in the Convention and
major controversy in the ratification debates." '8 8 The Framers thus
left the question whether inferior federal should be created to
Congress. The sole right to a federal forum was granted in a limited class of cases: the Supreme Court enjoyed original jurisdiction
in "all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and
Consuls, and those in which a State shall be a Party."' 8 9 The Constitution does not require creation of inferior courts. Accordingly,
it can hardly be claimed that a litigant-perhaps discounting those
over whom the Supreme Court possess original jurisdiction-has
the right to demand adjudication of a federal claim in a federal
forum.
If no federal courts had been created, then surely state courts
would have passed on federal questions. That the Framers contem187 Tim FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 3-6, 10 (Hart & Wechsler, eds.,

3d ed. 1988).
188 Id. at 10.
189 U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2, cl. 2.
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plated such circumstances is evidenced by the Supremacy Clause,
which provides that state court judges are bound by the Constitution and federal law. The first, Justice Harlan, observed that
"[up] on the State courts, equally with the courts of the Union, rests
the obligation to guard, enforce, and protect every right
granted or
90
secured by the Constitution of the United States."

In terms of historical practice, general federal question jurisdiction did not exist until the late nineteenth century. Prior to that
time, litigants asserting federal claims were limited to filing in state
court. Even today, certain federal causes of action can only be pursued in state court. When litigants, for example, assert federal defenses of immunities in suits brought in state court, they generally
have no right of removal to a federal forum. If a state court decides a question of civil rights law in the course of hearing a civil
claim, that decision is ordinarily binding on the parties and cannot
be relitigated in federal court. 191
In criminal cases, the Supreme Court has barred a criminal
defendant who pleaded guilty from seeking habeas relief on an antecedent violation of a constitutional right. 192 To stem the flood of
habeas petitions based on Fourth Amendment claims, the Court
has also restricted access to federal courts when claims of illegal
searches and seizures are made.19 3 It simply is not the case that a
federal forum must be provided in every instance in which a federal right is implicated. Given the constitutionalization of most
criminal procedure issues, as a practical matter it is impossible to
guarantee a federal forum for every alleged federal violation.
Asking whether state courts should hear federal causes is probably the wrong question. With the expansion of substantive due
process and the federalization of criminal procedure, state trial
courts will inevitably continue to hear and resolve many federal
constitutional claims. Unless we decide to dramatically expand the
number of federal judges, the majority of the claims decided in
state courts will never reach the federal system. State courts will
thus be in the position of articulating substantive constitutional
rights. We must therefore create an environment in which state
courts will be accorded respect and their decisions accepted by the
public.
190 Robb v. Connolly, 111 U.S. 624, 637 (1884).
191 SeeAllen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 103-04 (1980) (finding that a state court decision is resjudicata in a § 1983 suit).
192 See, e.g., Tollett v. Henderson, 411 U.S. 258 (1973); McMann v. Richardson, 397
U.S. 759 (1970).
193 See Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976).
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Incompetence of State Judges and JudicialProceedings

Behind many reform critics' concerns is the fear that state
court judges are simply not up to the task of protecting federal
rights. Reform critics argue that lifetime appointment-providing
federal judges with greater independence-external scrutiny, better pay, and more respect, attract better lawyers to the federal
bench.
Lifetime appointment, guaranteed to federal judges by Article
III,94 is not the norm in state courts. Lifetime tenure, however, is
often singled out as the most important guarantor of judicial independence. While that may be true, it is not necessarily the case
that ajudge enjoying a lifelong appointment will be more sensitive
to citizens' rights. Indeed, it may be the case thatjudges subject to
retention elections 9 5 will be more likely to respect certain rights,
such as the rights and values of the community.
In the same vein, while state court judges may not be subject
to scrutiny by the same individuals as their federal counterparts,
those judges who stand for election are subject to scrutiny by the
electorate. It is likely that such judges will tend better to reflect the
values of the community, and be more sensitive to protecting the
rights enjoyed by that community.
Nor is it clear that federal courts are necessarily the best forum
in which to protect federal constitutionalrights. As Professor Bator
has persuasively argued:
We are told that federal judges will be more receptive to constitutional values than state judges. What is really meant, however,
is that federal judges will be more receptive to some constitutional values than state judges. And the hidden assumption of
the argument is that the Constitution contains only one or two
sorts of values: typically, those which protect the individual
from the power of the state, and those which assure the superiority of federal to state law.
But the Constitution contains other sorts of values as well. It
gives the federal government powers, but also enacts limitations
on those powers. The limitations, too, count as settingforth constitutional values. Will the federal judge be more sensitive than the
state judge in insuring that these limitations are complied with?
U.S. CONST., art. III, § 1.
Few elected judges stand in partisan contests. According to the Bureau of Justice Statistics, three states have judges appointed for life, nine have nonelective retention, 19 have retentive elections, 12 have nonpartisan elections, and only seven states
have partisan elections for judicial candidates. U.S. BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS,
SOURCEBOOK OF CRiMINAL JuS'rIE STATISTICS 82 (1994).
194
195
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Whose institutional "set" is likely to make one more sensitive to
the values underlying the tenth amendment? Is a federal judge
likely to be more receptive than the state judge in honoring
other structural principles, such as separation of powers? Why
don't these sorts of issues ever seem to count?19 6
To answer Professor Bator's thoughtful question: these issues
do count.
2.

Correcting Manifestly Unjust imprisonments

At its core, habeas corpus is a remedy designed to free those
persons who have committed no crime. An illegally detained prisoner could force the executive to provide the legal grounds for her
incarceration. Indeed, early habeas cases generally involved circumstances in which the imprisoned person's guilt was gravely in
doubt.
Reform opponents invoke these cases as evidence of the need
to maintain broad based habeas review. In reality, however, habeas
is not a particularly effective means of reviewing evidence of guilt.
Until fairly recently, the petitioner's innocence was largely irrelevant to habeas cases. Originally, habeas writs issued when no legal
grounds exited on which to hold a defendant before trial. The
question of guilt was largely irrelevant; habeas corpus simply enabled the court to review the legal sufficiency of the detention.
Even today, after a steady expansion of scope, habeas serves as
a means of opening the door to procedural claims that might
otherwise be defaulted. 19 7 Innocence, absent assertion of the violation of a constitutional right, may not be sufficient grounds upon
which to issue habeas relief. Conversely (or perversely), habeas relief may be ordered on the basis of a constitutional violation that
has no bearing on the ultimate question of guilt. As a practical
matter, direct appeal and state collateral remedies are probably
better tools with which to plumb the depths of innocence or guilt.
The question of relitigating cases on collateral review in order
to provide a more perfect guilt determination raises questions of
limits. It might be the case that providing every convicted criminal
with a new trial whenever he made a claim of innocence might
result in greater justice. That is not necessarily the case, however.
196 Paul Bator, The State Courts and FederalConstitutionalLitigation. 22 WM. & MARY L.
Rv. 605, 631-34 (1981).
197 See, e.g., Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255, 271 (1989) (O'Connor, J., concurring).
The Supreme Court indicated in Herrera v. Collins, 506 U.S. 390 (1993), that innocence in and of itself may be a sufficiently compelling basis upon which to grant
habeas relief in a capital case.
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A retrial in and of itself is no guarantee of a just verdict. As Justice
Sandra Day O'Connor has noted, "[r]etrial becomes very difficult,
and sometimes impossible, when many years have passed since the
original trial. Witnesses and evidence become difficult to relocate;
memories fade." 198 Over time, it may become more difficult for
the prosecution to make its case, or conversely, more difficult for
the defendant to demonstrate his innocence.
Additional layers of review, habeas or otherwise, strain the judicial system's resources. Any expansion in a trial court's docket
places greater pressure on that court to move cases along, possibly
resulting in more emphasis being placed on getting the cases to
the jury than on getting the verdicts right. Similarly, courts of appeals, inundated with habeas petitions and direct appeals, may
spend less time on each case. The baby may be thrown out with
the bath water, so to speak, and meritorious claims denied the
careful consideration that they deserve. While I am not suggesting
that this is necessarily the current state of affairs, there is little
doubt that judges faced with burgeoning dockets must rely in
greater measure on inexperienced law clerks and time management techniques.
Moreover, contrary to certain insinuations, habeas corpus is
not the only relief available post-conviction. After a trial in which a
jury has found a defendant guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, the
prisoner has the option of seeking direct review by state intermediate and supreme courts. The prisoner may then petition the
United States Supreme Court for review of his case. After direct
appeals are exhausted, the petitioner may take advantage of state
post-conviction, collateral relief. Generally, at least three rounds of
review exist before such review is exhausted. In capital cases, the
prisoner may also petition the Governor for clemency. Thus,
before the prisoner ever files a federal habeas petition, he has at
least a half dozen opportunities to have his conviction reviewed.
Federal habeas is thus not the only procedure standing between a
convicted prisoner and the imposition of his sentence.
Proponents of the status quo have not sufficiently demonstrated that the additional layer ofjudicial review obtained through
habeas results in significant correction of injustices. The Senate
reform proposal maintains the highest purpose of the writ, namely,
correcting injustice, while at the same time affording respect to
state court adjudications.
198 Sandra Day O'Connor, Local Control of Crime, reprinted in HAB.AS CoRPus
Serial No. 39, 102d Cong., 1st Sess. 445 (1992).
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CONCLUSION

The objective of the law in criminal prosecution, the Supreme
Court has stated, is twofold: "that guilt shall not escape or innocence suffer."1 99 While the end of the criminal justice system is to
ensure that justice is actually meted out, achieving a just result is
not always easy. If one round of direct review increases the likelihood that a just verdict will result, then why not have two or three
rounds? If elected judges are somehow less likely to respect constitutional values, then why not nullify the judgments of all but lifetime appointed judges?
While these questions may be interesting, they are little more
than academic fancies. Scarce judicial resources prohibit guaranteeing endless rounds of review for criminal defendants. Common
sense dictates that we will not nullify the judgments of state courts
simply because they do not conform to the federal process of selection and appointment. As long as we maintain a system of federal
government and the states are not reduced to mere administrative
appendages of a national monolith, state courts will continue to
decide federal cases. The question has never been whether state
courts should or should not hear federal claims. The question is
whether, in the orderly administration of justice, federal courts
should replicate the state judicial process.
When we stray from sound judicial principles that have proven
useful over time, whether they are esoteric principles such as comity, or practical necessities such as time limits on appellate review,
we move into uncharted territory. As we experiment with new remedies in the hope that we will achieve a more perfect form ofjustice, we must continually reassess whether our efforts make sense.
A strong case cannot be made for imbuing federal courts with
the plenary authority to supervise their state counterparts. Nor is it
sensible to exempt habeas from some of the constraints we place
upon direct review. Such a construct flies in the face of soundjudicial administration and does not seem to have brought us any
closer to obtaining greater justice.
The Senate's attempt to restructure habeas practice is a return
to important principles of federalism and judicial respect. Habeas
cannot, and frankly should not, be relied upon as the principal
means of correcting injustice. If our goal is to ensure that no innocent person is ever convicted of a crime (a worthy, although difficult to achieve goal), habeas corpus is an inappropriate vehicle. As
199 Berger v. United States, 295 U.S. 78, 88 (1935).
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a remedy, it is unsuited to the type of inquiry that may be necessary
to achieve just results in troubling cases. At stake in this process is
the balancing of the procedural protections afforded defendants
against the need for maintaining the integrity and finality of the
decisions of our state courts. The reform proposal passed by the
Senate will go far in achieving each of these ends.

